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GETTING STUCK BETWEEN BOTTOM AND TOP:
STATE COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE
CHARTERS IN THE PRESENCE
OF NETWORK EFFECTS
Brett H. McDonnell*

ABSTRACT

For decades, American legal scholars have debated over the
implications of allowing corporations to choose in which state they will
incorporate, irrespective of where they do business. Until recently the
debate has centered almost exclusively on whether the managers who
choose where to incorporate have incentive to choose a state whose laws
favor managers to the disadvantage of shareholders (the "race to the
bottom" thesis) or whether their incentives are to choose states whose
laws treat shareholders properly (the "race to the top" thesis). Recently,
some scholars have questioned whether the state charter competition
process will necessarily lead to an optimal choice from the point of view
of corporate decision makers, whatever the incentives of those decision
makers might be. The presence of a variety of network effects may cause
corporations to incorporate in a state which already has taken the lead in
the charter race, even if some other states might offer better substantive
law. For instance, corporations may prefer a state which has a welldeveloped, and hence more predictable, body of corporate law, or they
may prefer to appear before judges who, from much experience, are
familiar with corporate law matters. These effects may cause the whole
system to get stuck with sub-optimal laws dominating.

* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Mel Eisenberg, Jill
Fisch, Gregory Jackson, Michael Klausner, David McGowan, Paul Rubin, and participants in a
session at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics for
comments on previous drafts, and to John Hutchins, Jessica Servais, and David Youngblood for
very helpful research assistance.

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:681

This Article takes the presence of significant network effects in
corporate charter competition as a given. It then asks whether allowing
competition between states is an attractive option, and how much
competition is best. Even if network effects create the possibility of
getting stuck with a sub-optimal dominant state, allowing competition
may improve the odds of reaching a good corporate legal system. This
Article presents a very simple model of charter competition as a way to
start thinking about the issues involved. Within that model, some
competition tends to lead to better results than no competition at all.
However, more competition is not necessarily better than less, and a
very large amount of competition may be as bad as no competition at all.
This Article considers many questions that remain quite open in
this area. It concludes by posing the question of how to make empirical
recommendations where theory and empirical evidence suggest no clear
answers. It suggests that little change from the present structure is likely,
and that critics have yet to make a persuasive case for such change.
I.

INTRODUCTION

For decades, corporate law scholars have been arguing about
Delaware. Roughly half of the largest corporations in the U.S. choose to
incorporate in Delaware.' No other state comes even remotely close to
this figure-Delaware dominates the competition among states in
attracting businesses to incorporate. Delaware began its domination
early in the twentieth century after New Jersey, the first leader in this
competition, faltered.2 Delaware has never faltered.
This Article advances two main arguments in the debate over
Delaware. First, it gives reasons why it may make sense to encourage
state competition for corporate charters even in the presence of network
effects and similar factors. Others have argued that these factors may
hinder state competition by allowing a state with inferior laws which has
gained a lead in the competition to maintain that lead. I respond that
competition cannot eliminate the possibility of inferior laws winning
out, but it can reduce the chances of that happening, as opposed to a
system where the national government imposes one set of laws on all
I. More than half of all public firms are incorporated in Delaware. See Robert Daines, Does
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 526 (2001). Almost half of all New
York Stock Exchange-listed companies are incorporated in Delaware, and nearly 60% of all Fortune
500 companies are incorporated there. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts
in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2000).
2. See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 677, 677-78 (1989).
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corporations. Even if inferior laws come to dominate, competition can
increase the chances that better laws may still be adopted in the future.
This provides a new twist on the old claim that the states are the
laboratories of democracy.
Second, this Article argues that in light of our ignorance as to the
best set of corporate laws and the best relationship between the national
and state governments in making those laws, and considering the
relatively decent comparative performance of our system of corporate
governance, there is no good reason to radically change our current
system of corporate law. Some reform in response to recent scandals
may be called for, but the basic system ain't broke-or if it is, we have
no alternative system to offer which we can trust will not make things
even worse. The present American system does appear to help meet
major goals for constructing a system of corporate lawmaking. State
competition allows for the capture of network benefits while still
creating a filter likely to lead to good laws coming to the fore, while the
national government's intervention through securities law helps guard
against concerns about the misbehavior of corporate decision makers.
The system has problems, as has become quite clear over the last year or
two, but no one has come up with a better one yet. Both major points,
and the spirit underlying them, can be summed up by appropriating that
hoary but vital old quote by Churchill on democracy: the American
system of corporate lawmaking is the worst possible system, except all
of the others that have been tried.3
William Cary started the modern scholarly debate over Delaware in
1974. 4 He argued that Delaware had taken a lead in a 'race for the
bottom"' among the states.' Cary's basic logic was simple: having many
corporations incorporated in a jurisdiction can bring much money to the
state through incorporation and other fees. 6 It can also benefit potentially
powerful interest groups within the state, particularly corporate lawyers.
States therefore will want to shape their statutory and decisional
corporate law in a way that attracts businesses to incorporate in them.'
Corporate officers and directors have most of the power to decide where
their corporations will incorporate. Therefore, states want to make their
3. See Winston Churchill, Speech in the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 216 (5th ed. 1999).

4. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
5. See id. at 664-66.
6. See id. at 668-69, 697-98.
7. See id. at 668.
8. See id. at 669.
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laws attractive to these officers and directors, rather than to
shareholders.9 Laws which favor incumbent managers over shareholders
are the result.' °
The attack on Cary began quickly. An early, eloquent, and still
influential statement of this response came in a 1977 article by Ralph
Winter." Winter accepted Cary's logic that corporate charter
competition will induce states to shape their laws in ways that corporate
decision makers favor.'2 He disagreed, though, that officers and directors
will prefer laws that inefficiently favor their interests over shareholders.' 3
Winter argued that a variety of market mechanisms will tend to align the
interests of managers and shareholders.' 4 If managers choose to
incorporate in a state with laws that hurt shareholders, those market
mechanisms will6 punish the managers.'" The race, he said, is to the top,
not the bottom.'
Most of the debate since then has focused on the mechanisms
which may align the interests of managers and shareholders. That is,
most participants have assumed that competition between the states will
indeed tend to push state law strongly towards the optimum from the
perspective of directors and executive officers, who dominate the choice
of where to incorporate." The debate has been over the incentives of
those decision makers. The discussion has been wide-ranging,
informative, and completely indeterminate. Good theoretical reasons
exist to believe that the interests of managers and shareholders are well
aligned, and good theoretical reasons exist to believe that they are not.
Empirical evidence and testing is equivocal. Section II reviews this
traditional literature.
For a long time, both sides in this debate faced a nagging problem:
Whether the race is to the bottom or to the top, why does Delaware's
lead seem so lasting and insurmountable? Both theories suggest that all,
or at least many, states will tend to mimic the successful elements of the
leading state's laws and try to improve upon any drawbacks in that law.

9. See id. at 698-99.
10. See id.
I1. See generally Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
12. See id. at 253.
13. See id. at 256-57.
14. See id. at 256.
15. See id. at 256-57.
16. See id. at 254-58.
17. See id. at 252 (noting that, in almost all cases, the decision as to which state to incorporate
in is a managerial decision).
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The corporate laws of the various states will thereby come to resemble
each other more and more closely, as states learn what works and what
does not in attracting incorporation. This, indeed, has happened. Why
should the leading state be able to retain and even enhance its market
share in this process? That, too, has happened. Neither of the basic
theories had a particularly good explanation for why this is so.
Recently, several scholars have developed some answers. Roberta
Romano made some of the original arguments. 8 In the mid-nineties
Michael Klausner, alone and with Marcel Kahan, took some of
Romano's points, added some important new ones, and put them into the
broader theoretical context of recent work in economics on network
effects.' 9 Success may beget further success in a variety of ways which
can become self-reinforcing. For instance, states with more corporations
have more judicial precedents in corporate laws, which can lead to
greater predictability. ° States which derive strong benefits from having
many businesses incorporated there may become committed to keeping
the law favorable to corporate decision makers. More corporate cases
may lead to a more experienced and expert judiciary. Corporate lawyers
and service companies know more about the leading state than other
states. All of these gains from having many corporations incorporated in
a state, in turn, make that state more favorable to future new
incorporations or reincorporations. Section III reviews these arguments.
The presence of such network effects, however, gives rise to several
new obstacles which may prevent state corporate laws from being
optimal. Consider two states, both of which are striving to get companies
to incorporate under their laws. State A is the traditional leader, and has
attracted many more corporations than state B. The lawmakers in state B
come up with what looks like some great new innovations, which may
well make the law in state B superior to state A. Will new businesses
now choose to incorporate in B rather than A, and will corporations
which have already chosen A now reincorporate in state B? Not
necessarily, even if you agree with Judge Winter that managerial
incentives and shareholder interests are well-aligned. Network effects
favoring state A such as those mentioned in the previous paragraph may
outweigh the greater efficiency of the law in state B. When this happens,
18. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).
19. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA.
L. REV. 757 (1995); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate "), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997).
20. See Daines, supra note 1, at 526.
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economists say that the market between states for corporate charters has
become locked-in to an inefficient equilibrium. Section III provides
more details on the potential inefficiencies due to network effects.
Thus, as conceptualized so far, corporate law scholars have seen the
presence of network effects as providing further reasons why state
competition for corporate charters may provide sub-optimal results.
Thus, even if one accepts the Winter position that managers and
shareholders have their incentives aligned, network effects may imply
that the race is not necessarily to the top. States may get stuck on their
way to the top, even if market forces are pushing in that direction. The
presence of network effects therefore has had the effect of giving further
reasons to be skeptical about the benefits of state competition, although
Klausner and others are actually careful about drawing inferences about
the benefits of state competition as opposed to federal provision of
corporate law.
I take Klausner's point about possible lock-in to an inefficient
equilibrium as my starting point. However, I strike out in a different
direction by asking a different question. Let us take as given the
possibility that fairly strong network effects exist in this area. Lock-in to
an inefficient equilibrium is thus a real possibility too. Given this, is any
competition between states desirable, or would we be better off with just
one provider of corporate law, presumably the federal government? And,
if some competition is desirable, how much is most desirable? Between
two states? Three states? Ten states? Fifty states? The presence of
network effects poses at least two problems for state charter competition.
First, the system may lock-in to a state with a bad law. Second, even if
the dominant state starts with a good law, once it has achieved
dominance, competition may no longer give the state reason to continue
to adapt and improve its law. In this Article, I focus on the first problem.
At first glance that problem may seem of merely historical interestU.S. corporations locked-in to Delaware nearly a century ago, after all.
However, how likely it is that we locked-in to an initially attractive law
affects our evaluation of how attractive that law is likely to be today, and
hence our evaluation of how much reason we may have to want to
change that law.
The answers as to the desirability of competition in the presence of
network effects are more subtle and favorable to at least some degree of
state competition than one might imagine-that is the first major point
of this Article, as mentioned above. If one assumes that the federal
government has privileged access to knowledge about what corporate
law is best, then competition does not look attractive. But there is no
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reason to believe the federal government, or anyone else, has special
access to such knowledge. If one assumes that all potential providers of
corporate law are equal in their knowledge as to the best law, then a
basic trade-off appears. On the one hand, if network effects are strong,
we would actually like for one jurisdiction to eventually become
dominant. That is because we want companies to enjoy the benefits from
network effects, and that can happen only if they all incorporate within
the same jurisdiction. On the other hand, we want this dominant
jurisdiction to choose a law that is as close to the optimum as possible.
Paul David, an economic historian who has been a leader in
developing arguments about network effects and related concepts,
suggests that one sensible policy response is to slow down, but not
completely stop, the move to market dominance and encourage a fairly
thorough exploration of a variety of alternatives before settling on one.2'
I suggest that state competition for corporate charters may be a
mechanism for doing precisely that. In the early days of competition
between states, several different states may present several different
models of corporate laws. If there is some uncertainty as to which model
is best, corporations may experiment, some choosing one state, some
choosing another. Over time, as experience accumulates, one state pulls
into a lead. New corporations increasingly choose that state, and
companies incorporated elsewhere reincorporate into the leading state.
Eventually that state becomes overwhelmingly dominant, like Delaware
today. It is possible that the leading state's law is not the best possible,
nor even the best among the laws that were once in competition.
However, if there was initially fairly vigorous competition among a
variety of states, then the chances that the winner's law is pretty close to
an optimum are pretty good.
On the other hand, competition between too many differing state
laws may be too much of a good thing. In an overcrowded field, a state
that happens to be preferred by some outlier corporations may come to
take the lead, and network effects may then induce other corporations to
choose that state. As the number of competing states increases, who
wins the competition may become increasingly random, with little bias

21. See Paul A. David, Path Dependence, Its Critics and the Quest for 'Historical
Economics,' in EVOLUTION AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN ECONOMIC IDEAS: PAST AND PRESENT (P.
Garrouste & S. lovannides eds., 2000) [hereinafter Historical Economics]; Paul A. David, Path
Dependence in Economic Processes: Implications for Policy. Analysis in Dynamical Systems
Contexts, in EVOLUTIONARY FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICS (Kurt Dopfer ed., forthcoming, 2004)

[hereinafter Economic Processes].
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in favor of those states offering the best laws. The best situation, then,
may be competition among just a few alternative legal regimes.22
Section IV, the heart of this Article, develops this argument in more
detail, first conceptually and then using a simple mathematical model of
state competition. I intend this not simply as a contribution to the
literature on the competition for corporate charters. It also contributes to
the literature on network effects, path dependence, and lock-in to
inefficient equilibria. Appropriate policy interventions in the face of
network effects is an important but still not well-understood problem for
this literature. I mentioned above Paul David's suggestions as to
appropriate policy. Conceiving of competition between states as a way
of implementing his approach gives a new way of thinking about the old
argument of states as the laboratories of democracy.
I should also mention that, for purposes of Sections III and IV, I
assume the truth of Winter's position, that managers' incentives are
aligned with shareholders. I do so in order to focus on the problems
created by network effects. I do not do so because I believe the
assumption is true. Relaxing that assumption has major policy
implications. I return to that point later in this Article. Another way of
taking these Sections is to assume that when I refer to a state law as
being "good," "better," or "best," I mean good, etc., from the perspective
of the officers and directors who choose where to incorporate, putting
aside whether their incentives are properly aligned with the interests of
shareholders. The first main point of this Article can then be phrased as a
contingent conclusion: some degree of competition between states can
help to increase the chances that the dominant state's law is good, as
good is understood by corporate decision makers. If those corporate
decision makers have proper incentives, great. If not, then that may
provide arguments against state competition. However, those arguments
are the traditional Cary points, not the new set of arguments based on
network effects and increasing returns on which this Article is focused.
If my argument has merit, then an important empirical question
becomes the early history of the competition among states for corporate
22. This argument deals with locking in to an attractive set of laws in the first place. A
separate issue is whether state competition helps prod the dominant state to improve its laws after
achieving dominance. I touch on that issue briefly in this Article, but I do not analyze it in any
detail. I turn to that issue in a work in progress. See Brett H. McDonnell, The Ambiguous Virtues of
Our Mixed Federal System of CorporateLaw. That paper builds on recent contributions by Bebchuk
and Hamdani and Kahan and Kamar. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani,
Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112
YALE L. J. 553 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002).
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charters. How many states tried to compete seriously with Delaware and
New Jersey? How different were the alternatives offered? Did the
competition remain in doubt for very long before Delaware's dominance
became too great? Section V takes a look at these questions. It finds that
there was some significant competition, though not necessarily all that
much. The model of Section IV suggests that may have been a good setup, although we are a long way from understanding what process of
competition among states is really best. Section V also reminds us that
current American corporate law is not a fully federalized, state-based,
competitive system. Some important corporate law is set at the national
level, under national securities laws.
Finally, in Section VI, I consider what my arguments may imply for
some recent policy proposals concerning federalism in corporate and
securities law. Here, I must revisit the question about the extent to which
the Winter position on managerial incentives is correct. I am doubtful
how correct it is. Thus, the original Cary position still has much force.
But, its force is as yet far from decisive. I conclude that to date neither
side has been able to marshal adequately persuasive theoretical
arguments or empirical evidence. There is no strong reason to opt for
either side in the debate. What are the policy implications? Right now,
American law opts for state competition in corporate law but a mainly
national, unified approach to securities law. Some people would like to
federalize securities law, pushing Winter's position even further. Some,
including Cary, want to nationalize corporate law. I argue that given our
current knowledge, there is no good reason for making any big changes
from the status quo-that is the second main thesis of this Article.
Setting the framework for making corporate law requires a complex
balancing of several goals. We want to achieve the benefits or increasing
returns while still achieving some gains from competition in terms of
reaching a good law and improving on it. We also need to protect against
possible race to the bottom effects due to managerial misincentives. We
face pervasive uncertainty and lack of knowledge in deciding how best
to balance those goals. Our current mix of national and state law seems
to do a pretty good job, and proponents of different systems have not yet
given an adequately strong reason for discarding that system. That is not
to say that we want no change at all. The conclusion considers one or
two proposals of moderate change that make a good deal of sense. These
reforms, though, work within the base current system of competing state
laws bordered by national securities law.
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TO THE BOTTOM OR THE Top? THE TRADITIONAL LITERATURE

Under the internal affairs doctrine, a corporation's internal
governance is legally regulated by the corporate law of the state in which
the corporation is incorporated.23 A corporation may incorporate in any
state, even if it does no business in that state.24 There is no general
federal incorporation. States, thus, may compete with each other in
attracting businesses to incorporate in their state. 5 This raises the
question of whether such competition is likely to result in good or
harmful corporate law. Delaware has won the race for large
corporations-nearly sixty percent of the largest 500 corporations in the
U.S. are incorporated in Delaware, 6 and Delaware has maintained, even
widened, this lead for about a century.27 Thus, the question as to the
result of the state competition for corporate charters becomes largely a
question as to why Delaware has been so dominant, and whether that is a
good thing.
A.

Origins of the Debate

The modern debate over Delaware begins with William Cary's
1974 article.28 Cary noted that the top management of a corporation,
along with its dominant shareholders, is generally able to determine in
what state a corporation is incorporated at the time it goes public.2 9 Thus,
corporations are likely to choose to incorporate in states whose laws
those actors find favorable. A key point of corporate law is that
sometimes the interests of incumbent managers and ordinary
shareholders may diverge. In a large public corporation with many
dispersed small shareholders, the shareholders may have a hard time
detecting and punishing managerial opportunism. Thus, an important
function of corporate law is to help police such opportunism. State laws
23. See Daines, supra note 1, at 526.
24. See Winter, supra note I1, at 252.
25. As mentioned above, this is not so for matters governed by federal securities law. See
infra notes 226-33 and accompanying text.
26. See Fisch, supra note 1,at 1061.
27. Delaware's share of corporations going public in 1996-2000 is even higher than its share
of all public or Fortune 500 companies. See Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions
Where to Incorporate (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 03/2002, 2002)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=304386 (October 2002).
28. See generally Cary, supra note 4. Cary simply began the modem debate. The origins of
debate over the race to the bottom go back to the early days of the race, when New Jersey was the
leading state. See, e.g., Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State, MCCLURE'S MAGAZINE, May
1905, at 42; U.S. INDUS. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 642-43 (1902).
29. See Cary, supra note 4, at 663-66.
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may vary as to how they perform this policing function, and as to how
strong and rigid their rules against managerial opportunism are.30
Cary's core point is simple: top managers choose where to
incorporate, and insofar as they prefer a state with more lax corporate
laws, they will choose to incorporate in states with more lax laws.3' This
goes against the interests of shareholders. States which try to provide
stricter laws will see corporations incorporating elsewhere. 32 Hence the
race to the bottom: those states which offer the most lax corporate laws
will attract the most corporations, inducing other states to either copy
those lax laws or else drop out of the competition and resign themselves
to having few domestically incorporated large businesses. After setting
out this simple logic, Cary attempts to demonstrate his point by looking
at a variety of areas of corporate law and arguing that Delaware has
adopted lax rules in each of those areas. 31
Cary's article immediately attracted much attention, and many
argued against it. The most prominent early attack came from Ralph
Winter in 1977. 34 Winter agreed with Cary that the state competition for
charters will cause states to shape their laws to suit the preferences of
corporate management.35 He disagreed with Cary over what management
will tend to prefer.' It is true that at the point where managers have
actually engaged in opportunistic acts, or plan to do so.soon, they would
like to have only weak laws against such acts. However, when
managers choose ex ante what corporate law to be governed by, their
incentives look different. A variety of market mechanisms may punish
them if they choose a state with lax laws. 38 Winter argues that, for the
most part, these market mechanisms are effective enough that they will
induce corporate decision makers to adopt that state whose laws are
most efficient. 39 That does not necessarily mean they will adopt the laws
which most strenuously guard against managerial opportunism. There
may be a trade-off between strict safeguards and providing corporations
and their managers enough flexibility and discretion that they can
30. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 26 (1985 & Supp. 2002).
31. See Cary, supra note 4, at 663-66.
32. See id.
at 666.
33. See id.
at 670-84.
34. See generally Winter, supra note 1I.
35. See id. at 253.
36. See je. at 256.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 256-57; cf Cary, supra note 4, at 663-68 (discussing the powerful incentives for
corporations to incorporate in jurisdictions that provide greater protection and freedom from
restrictions).
39. See Winter, supra note 11, at 275.
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respond well to ever-changing market conditions.4' Winter argues that at
the time of incorporation or going public corporate managers will have
the incentive to choose to be governed by laws that make this trade-off
optimally given the circumstances of their business.4'
B. ManagerialIncentives
Much discussion since has focused on whether markets do indeed
give managers incentive to take into account the interests of
shareholders. Supporters of Winter's race to the top thesis have
advanced a variety of market mechanisms. 42 A core point is that
shareholders can easily tell in which state a business is incorporated and
what the corporate laws of that state are like. If a corporation
incorporates in a lax state whose laws hurt shareholders, the
shareholders should realize that and pay less for stock in that corporation
than if it were incorporated in a state with better laws. 43 Thus, at the time
a company goes public, when generally a small group owns most of the
company's shares, that group has incentive to see to it that the company
incorporates in a state with good laws. Any expected loss to shareholders
from bad laws should be reflected in the price the company will get for
its shares upon going public, and so the existing dominant shareholders
will internalize the harm a bad state's laws will cause future small
shareholders, and therefore be induced to optimally balance that harm
against whatever private benefits may exist to them from being governed
by lax laws.44
The market for corporate control provides another brake on
managerial opportunism. Managers in states with lax laws who are not
treating their shareholders well should see a stock price that is well
below what it could be if that same company were well-managed in a
state with better laws. This gap creates a potential for hostile takeovers.
After a takeover, the bad management is removed. The mere threat of
this may prevent much managerial opportunism.45

40. See id. at 260.
41. See id. at 262-66.
42. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 213-15 (1991); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited:

Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 91819 (1982); Winter, supra note Ii, at 262-66.
43. See Daines, supra note I, at 526.
44. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
45. See Winter, supra note 1I, at 264-66.
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Managerial compensation is another important market mechanism.
Much of the compensation of top corporate executives is often tied to the
company's stock price, through stock ownership, options, bonuses tied
to stock price, and so on. Thus, any decision which reduces the value of
the company's stock will hurt its executives. This too helps make
managers internalize the interests of shareholders.46
A few other limits on managers are also worth mentioning. For
those who would like to move on to another job elsewhere, managerial
labor markets constrain their behavior. 7 If the stock of their current
company falls, their chances of moving on to a better job are diminished.
Corporate boards dominated by independent outside directors may help
represent the interests of shareholders. 4' Large institutional investors
have in the last decade or two become somewhat more active in
monitoring corporate governance.49 In what state a company is
incorporated is a particularly simple item to monitor.
Some commentators, though, have been skeptical about the
helpfulness of these market constraints on managers. 0 Markets may not
be as good at valuing corporate shares as those in the Winter tradition
assume. For some time the semi-strong version of the efficient market
hypothesis was assumed by most corporate law scholars to be largely
correct. Under this hypothesis, all publicly available information about a
company is quickly and accurately reflected in that company's price."
Since state of incorporation is certainly publicly available information,
the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis supports the Winter
argument.
However, more recently many corporate finance and law scholars
have begun to call into question the semi-strong version of the efficient
market hypothesis. Advances in both behavioral finance theory and in
46. See Fischel, supra note 42, at 919.
47. See id.
48. See Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (1998).
49. See Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69
N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1136-37 (1991); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 814 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 863, 867-68 (1991).
50. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 117-30 (2001) (discussing how the competitive
corporate law market has resulted in state "regulatory regime[s] that excessively restrict[] hostile
takeovers"); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1437 (1992).
51. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383, 404 (1970).
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empirical testing have suggested that securities markets may be more
flawed than previously believed.52 Investors may be subject to systematic
biases, which lead them to make predictable mistakes. Arbitrage may be
risky and costly enough that sophisticated investors do not bid away the
price effect of those systematic mistakes. Stock prices are likely to be
particularly suspect for smaller companies that have fewer analysts
covering them and in general less attention paid to them. Moreover, the
effect of state corporate law on the future welfare of shareholders,
considered from the time of the initial public offering, may be relatively
distant and speculative. If setting stock prices is more of a crap shoot
than traditional law and economic analysis would have it, then it is quite
possible that the chaos of trying to price a new company's stock
accurately, taking into account hundreds of idiosyncratic factors, will
completely swamp out any effect the state of incorporation may have on
the price.
The market for corporate control also looks today like more of a
bust in disciplining managers than it did in the mid-eighties. Entrenched
managers have figured out a variety of ways to effectively prevent
unwanted takeovers, most notoriously the poison pill. Hostile takeover
attempts are nowadays a relatively rare event, and successful ones are
rarer still.' 3 Moreover, even Winter acknowledged that in choosing
among state laws specifically affecting takeovers, managers may not
have the proper incentives, as if they choose a state which allows them
to block against takeovers, one of the strongest 4 mechanisms
guaranteeing managerial accountability will cease to work.1
The other mechanisms discussed above have major question marks
as well. Managerial compensation tied to stock price does not work well
if the stock price does not reflect information well. Moreover, it appears
that top managers are often pretty good at guarding themselves against
the effects of stock price drops. Indeed, many now believe that the
strong use of equity-based compensation is not a major limit on
managerial opportunism, but rather itself an effect of such
opportunism-a way to make top corporate executives fabulously
wealthy.5"

52. See ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
(2000).
53. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supro note 50, at 117-40 (discussing the variety of obstacles to
hostile takeover bids and the effectiveness of defensive measures against such bids).
54. See Winter, supra note I1,at 287-89.
55. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., ManagerialPower and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753-55 (2002).
FINANCE
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Imperfections in stock prices also affect the ability of managerial
labor markets to discipline managers. Furthermore, the tie between an
individual manager's performance and the company's performance is
often quite obscure, limited, and hard for an outsider to discern, making
this a highly imperfect form of monitoring. Independent boards have
surprisingly little proven ability to improve corporate performance."6
Institutional investors are still for the most part usually reluctant to
become heavily involved in corporate governance."
Thus, the long debate over the extent to which market mechanisms
induce managers to choose the optimal state of incorporation is
inconclusive. There are good theoretical arguments both for and against
each mechanism. We shall consider shortly attempts to address the
question in a systematic empirical way. We shall find those attempts
wanting.
From early on in this debate, going right back to Winter, many
advocates of the race to the top position have admitted that laws
affecting hostile turnovers may be at least a partial exception to their
position. 8 Since the hostile takeover mechanism is one of the main
market constraints on managers, if managers can take advantage of laws
which allow them to avoid takeovers, then much of the market discipline
on managers will go away. There are several points to make about this
exception to the supposed general rule.
First of all, it is an awfully big exception. Takeover law is one of
the most important and heatedly debated areas of corporate law. As just
noted, hostile takeovers and the threat thereof are one of the main
alleged restraints on managerial misbehavior. 9 If the corporate charter
competition does indeed lead to a race to the bottom in this one area, that
in itself is a very big lapse.
Second, if state takeover law does indeed allow managers to avoid
the threat of takeovers, that calls the entire story underlying the race to
the top thesis into question. After all, one of the main market
mechanisms that is supposed to give managers an incentive to
incorporate in states with the most efficient laws is the threat of
takeovers: if managers choose to incorporate in a state with bad laws, it
56. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence
and Long-Term Firm, Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002).
57. See John C. Coftee, Jr., The Folklore of Investor Capitalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1970,
1971 (1997); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 480 (1991).
58. See Winter, snpra note II, at 287-89; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 42, at 21823.
59. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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will be reflected in their stock price, which will make the company
vulnerable to a takeover. If incumbent managers can prevent such
takeovers, part of the pain they face from low stock prices is eliminated.
Unless other market mechanisms work to align the interests of managers
and shareholders, the whole story collapses. Of course, as mentioned
above, there are potentially other mechanisms to correct managerial
misbehavior. 60 Still, the loss of the takeover mechanism does call the
whole theory into question.
Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell have noted this defect in the race
to the top thesis. 6' In response, they have suggested giving companies the
option of choosing to be governed by a set of federal rules regarding
takeovers. 62 The federal rules would make it harder for incumbent
managers to adopt anti-takeover defenses. Bebchuk and Ferrell would
also give shareholders the power to opt in to this federal regime without
the approval of the board of directors. 63 1 will discuss this proposal in
Section VI.
C. Public Choice
Another area into which the race to the top/bottom discussion has
ventured is public choice questions as to the differential presence of
interest groups at the state and federal level and the incentives facing
state and federal governmental decision makers. This debate too has
been inconclusive.
Macey and Miller have presented an interest group theory of the
development of Delaware corporate law.6 The benefits from being the
leading state in corporate law can be captured and distributed in a variety
of ways. The state can capture the benefits itself through corporate
charter and other fees.65 Indeed, this is a major part of the income for the
state of Delaware.66 However, interest groups may also capture much of
the benefit. Most significantly, the Delaware corporate bar benefits
tremendously from Delaware's dominance. Lobbying by corporate
lawyers may help push the law in ways that help them-for instance, by
rules that encourage suits (e.g., the lack of a security for expenses
60. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
61. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 50, at 13.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 469 (1987).
65. See id. at 491.
66. See id. at 490.
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requirement) or by indeterminate rules which encourage suits because
the outcomes are unclear. Also notable is the role of corporate service
companies such as the Corporation Trust Company and the Corporation
Service Company.67
Others, most notably Roberta Romano, point out that the political
economy of Delaware may be healthier for the creation of corporate law
than that of other states. 68 For instance, corporations incorporated in
Delaware include both potential takeover targets and potential acquirors,
thereby creating some lobbying pressure both for weaker and for strong
anti-takeover laws.69 In other states, potential targets tend to
predominate, creating strong incentives for state legislatures to pass laws
which help incumbent managers defend against hostile takeovers.7 °
Indeed, many state takeover laws outside of Delaware seem to have been
passed when a major local corporation became the target of a takeover
threat.7'
However, this response has its limits. Consider a proposed law in
Delaware which would make defense against takeovers harder. Now
consider the response of Aggressive Corp, which has been on an
acquisition binge, and Timid Corp, which is the subject of takeover
rumors. The management of Timid Corp clearly opposes the bill, and
they may threaten to reincorporate elsewhere if it passes. The threat may
be credible. Aggressive Corp may like the bill and lobby in favor of it.
However, the incentives of Aggressive's management are mixed-after
all, Aggressive itself may become a takeover target at some point, and
since many of the companies which it wants to acquire may not be
governed by Delaware law, that makes the effect of Delaware's law in
enabling takeovers less crucial to it. Most importantly, Aggressive's
management cannot credibly threaten to reincorporate elsewhere if it
does not get its way on the bill-since the law of the target's state
governs the ease of takeovers, reincorporation to a more takeoverfriendly state does the acquiror no good.
What would be the incentives of the federal Congress and
administrators should the U.S. opt for a national corporate law? On the
one hand, the federal jurisdiction would mean that there would be a fully
representative sample of affected companies, and very little threat by
67. Seeid. at491.
68. See Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111,
113 (1987).
69. See id. at 141.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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target management to reincorporate elsewhere, avoiding the problem just
analyzed. The federal government may also have some incentive to
choose the most efficient set of corporate law rules insofar as such rules
would maximize tax revenues. On the other hand, the lack of
competition for the corporate charter business would probably make the
federal government less responsive to changes in the business
environment. A federal regime would probably as a result be less
innovative. Bad corporate laws would be more likely to stay in place."
Moreover, shareholder and other non-managerial interests might not be
represented well at the federal level due to familiar free riding problems
in political lobbying. Of course, the same problem occurs at the state
level.
Furthermore, consider the federal bureaucracy which would
administer a federal system of laws, and probably write rules
implementing those laws. The Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") gives a good example, and might very well be the agency
which would be entrusted with this responsibility. Many public choice
theorists think that agencies tend to write overly broad and often vague
rules as a way of enhancing their own power." The SEC shows at least
some signs of this.74
D. The TraditionalDebate Summarized
Overall, the discussion of the incentives facing corporate, state, and
federal decision makers suggests something like the following,
illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose potential corporate law regimes are
arrayed on a continuum from unrestrictive to restrictive, with an optimal
point somewhere in between the extremes. Consider the probability
distribution over this continuum induced by a regime of state
competition versus a federal regime. It might be that the state law regime
is somewhat biased to an overly unrestrictive result, but that competition
reduces the variation in the likely result-that is, competition will push
the system pretty close to an area somewhat less restrictive than optimal.
In contrast, the federal regime may be more likely to reach a more
restrictive outcome-indeed, the most likely outcome could even be
more restrictive than optimal. However, there is greater variance in the
72. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 50, at 158; ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF

AMERICAN LAW 48-50 (1993).
73.

See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

(1971).
74.

See HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH

OF A PURPOSE 40-47 (1979).
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possible result in the federal system, because in the absence of
competition there is less pressure pushing the system toward any
particular outcome. Which system is better? That depends both on how
far the two means are from the optimum, and how different the variances
are.

Thus, the theoretical debate to date leaves it quite open as to
whether state competition or a federal system of corporate law is better.
Does empirical evidence on the effect of corporate law in Delaware
versus other states help us figure out which side is right? I don't think
so, at least not so far, and probably not ever. To fully understand the
empirical evidence, though, we need to consider the effects of network
and learning effects in state corporate law. I therefore defer discussion of
the empirical literature until the end of the next Section, which analyzes
those effects. 5
One other point on the discussion so far: it assumes that
maximizing shareholder value is the goal which corporations and
corporate law should be pursuing. Thus, the focus is on the possible
misalignment of the incentives of managers and shareholders. Some
argue that other stakeholder groups should be weighed in the balance as
well. 6 I am one of those people; in particular, I think the interests of
employees should be a significant part of the calculus. It would be
interesting to reconsider the whole debate in the light of other
stakeholder groups. Since the market mechanisms emphasized by those
arguing for a race to the top appear to work only to align the interests of
managers and shareholders, to the extent that shareholders' interests are
at odds with those of other stakeholders, then even if advocates are right
about those mechanisms, one might still be skeptical as to whether the
race is really to the top. Does this mean that if those mechanisms do not
actually work at all well, then the result might actually be better from the
perspective of other stakeholders?77 That would appear to depend on
whether the interests of other stakeholders are better aligned with those
of managers as opposed to shareholders. That is not an easy question.
Would other stakeholders be more likely to have a voice in a system of
federal law rather than state law? Perhaps, but the political economy
considerations underlying that question are also complicated. The
75. See infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283,
287 (1998); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 902 (1993).
77. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST
EXPORT 185 (2001).
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questions raised here are very interesting, but they go beyond the scope
of this Article. Hence I will not consider them further here, although I
will briefly return to the point at the end of Section VI on policy
implications.
Ill.

NETWORK AND LEARNING EFFECTS IN STATE CORPORATE LAW

Both the race to the bottom and the race to the top hypotheses lead
to the following puzzle. Both theories suggest that other states will come
to emulate the state which has gained the lead in garnering company
incorporations. They both thus suggest that differences in state corporate
law will tend to shrink over time. If that is so, then it would seem that
the state in the lead should gradually lose its advantage over time, and
other states should gain some market share at its expense.
That has not happened. Be the race to the bottom or to the top,
Delaware took the lead early in the twentieth century. Since then, its lead
has if anything widened, and there are no signs of slippage. How can we
explain this, and what are the practical consequences of that
explanation? In this Section, we explore an important recent explanation
based on network and learning effects in corporate law. The rest of this
Article explores some potential consequences if this explanation is right.
A few years ago Michael Klausner, in papers both on his own and
with Marcel Kahan, began to apply notions of network and learning
effects to corporate law."8 Network and learning effects refer to
mechanisms whereby a leading company, technology, standard, or, in
our case, state, becomes more attractive to new adopters of the item in
question simply by virtue of being the leader. 9 New adopters therefore
tend to adopt the leader, which increases its lead, making it yet more
attractive to newer adopters, and so on in a self-reinforcing cycle.80 A
classic example is telephone networks-a network becomes more
attractive to new users as more people connect to that network. In the
last several decades, economists have explored the logic of such effects
in much detail, and that work has begun to percolate into legal research.8'
Klausner's work is an important instance of the spread of those ideas.82
78. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
79. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Inplications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 483 (1998).
80. See generally id., for a general overview of network effects.
81. A seminal early discussion is W. Brian Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in
Economics, in THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM 9 (Philip W. Anderson et al.
eds., 1988).
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Network effects and learning effects are similar, but slightly different.
Network effects refer to instances where adopters want to follow the
dominant technique because they expect many people to follow it in the
future. 83 Learning effects occur where adopters want to adopt a technique
because it has already been widely adopted.84
In this Section I will first describe several forms of network and
learning effects which Klausner and others have analyzed in corporate
law. I then turn to a consideration of some of the general principles
which we can learn from situations where these effects exist. This
Section concludes by considering what has so far been argued about the
application of these effects to corporate law.
A.

Sources of Network and Learning Effects in CorporateLaw

Why might companies prefer to incorporate in a state which has
many large companies incorporated in it? One reason may be the greater
predictability associated with more legal precedents.85 More predictable
law allows companies to plan better. Even if a corporate code is clearly
written, inevitably the application of that code will be unclear in many
instances. Other parts of corporate law are not codified at all and
develop from the general, often vague, principles of the common law. In
corporate law, this is particularly true in the important area of fiduciary
duties, where the general principle is broad and vague, and greater
clarity comes mainly from seeing how courts actually apply that
principle in specific instances. A state with many corporations is likely
to have more court cases applying its corporate law to those
corporations. That expanding case law hopefully leads to greater
predictability.
Note that there is both a learning and a network effect here. The
learning effect comes from the expansive case law that may already exist
at the time a company chooses where to incorporate. The network effect
comes from the future case law which the company expects will develop
82. The spread of new ideas may itself exhibit network effects. When a new idea is first
described, it may be hard for other people to understand, especially if the idea is quite novel. Others
may be reluctant to consider, adopt, and use the idea because it is so hard to follow. However, if
some people gradually find the idea useful and use it, the idea may eventually become more
comprehensible to more people. New users of the idea will find more people able to follow them,
and will have to spend less and less time explaining the basics of the idea. The logic underlying
network and learning effects seems to have gone through such a process in economics, and is doing
so now in law.
83. See Klausner, supra note 19, at 774-75.
84. See id. at 788.
85. See id. at 843-44.
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in a state with many domestic corporations. For our purposes the
network effect is more important. That is because lagging states can
match the learning effects gained by a leading state's case law by
adopting wholesale the existing case law of that state. Delaware did that
to New Jersey at the turn of the twentieth century.86 Thus, this particular
learning effect does not help protect a state's lead very well.87 However,
the network effect is harder to duplicate. A state can say now that it will
follow existing Delaware case law. However, it is harder to credibly
commit to following all future Delaware case law. Future cases may
become inconsistent with future Delaware cases, either because the
state's courts decide an issue and then a later Delaware case goes in a
different direction or because future judges decide they are unwilling to
follow some Delaware precedents. 8" In part the difficulty of committing
to following future Delaware precedent is due to commitment problems
considered as the next source of network effects. But in part the problem
is due to the nature of judicial decision-making itself. A state competing
with Delaware may want to imitate Delaware, but may find that as its
courts deal with new issues that vary from those presented in Delaware
courts, its courts come up with doctrines that may become hard to
reconcile with future Delaware decisions. Moreover, different judges
will inevitably come to different conclusions about how the law should
be developed and applied in new circumstances, even if they are
politically committed to the same goal of serving corporate
constituencies.
I should note that not all observers think that predictability is a
particularly obvious quality of Delaware case law. There is a fairly
widespread complaint that that law has become somewhat arbitrary,
complex, and hard to predict.89 There is now an argument that Delaware
courts have used their leading position, explainable by other factors, to
make their case law overly indeterminate, which may help the Delaware
bar.98 I will briefly examine that argument later in this Section.
Another phenomenon which can be conceptualized as a network
effect is commitment to future responsiveness, first analyzed by Roberta
86. See Grandy, supra note 2, at 685.
87. However, such a learning effect may help protect the dominance of that state's approach
to corporate law, even if it does not protect the state itself. See infra notes 180-82 and
accompanying text.
88. See Klausner, supra note 19, at 845 n.267.
89. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 1071.
90. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of hIdeterminacy in Corporate Law,
98 CoLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1928 (1998). See generally Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price
Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205 (2001).
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Romano.9 Revenue from charter fees is an important part of the income
of the state of Delaware, and its corporate bar is a powerful interest
group whose business depends on companies continuing to incorporate
in Delaware. 9' Thus, Delaware has strong incentives to continue to
provide a corporate law environment in the future which corporations
find inviting. The more the state has gained from serving as a base of
incorporation, the more it has to lose if it allows its laws to become
hostile-hence the network effect nature of this phenomenon. Corporate
decision makers may take this commitment to providing good 93 law in
the future into account in deciding where to incorporate. Although they
could always reincorporate if the state they choose becomes too hostile
in the future, reincorporation is a somewhat costly process, and
managers may not be able to convince future shareholders to go along.
This effect helps explain why a small state became dominant-the gains
from being the state of choice for corporation incorporation are likely to
be relatively more important to a small state like Delaware than they
would be to a large state. Note, though, that it is not inevitable that a
state leading this race will always remain committed to providing a
favorable climate-New Jersey's failure to do so under Governor
Woodrow Wilson created Delaware's opportunity to take the lead.94 We
will discuss that history in Section V.
Another factor is an experienced judiciary.9 Delaware, with its
many corporations and resulting large number of cases, has judges who
spend much of their time with corporate law cases. They know that law
very well, and they are familiar with the concerns businesspeople bring
in those cases. They are able to decide cases quickly and in a wellconsidered way. This is both a learning and a network effect. At the time
a company chooses to incorporate in Delaware, the judiciary is already
experienced-a learning effect. Moreover, the company can rest assured

91. See Romano, supra note 18, at 242.
92. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 1061, 1070.
93. In this and the following Section, 1 will frequently refer to "good" law, or "better" law,
and ask how well state competition pushes the dominant state towards a good law. The goodness of
the law so referred to can be understood for these Sections in one of two ways. First, one could
assume, for argument's sake, that the race to the top theorists are right and that corporate managers'
incentives do largely coincide with the social welfare. Second, one could remain agnostic on this
point and simply understand "good" as good from managers' point of view, whether or not that
coincides with what is socially good. The point for now is to analyze how well state competition
selects for the law that corporate decision makers want. I will return to the question of whether
managers have proper incentives in the final Section.
94. See Grandy, supra note 2. at 687-89.
95. See Klausner, supra note 19, at 845.
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that future judges will likely also be experienced, as Delaware continues
to hear many corporate law cases-a network effect.
96
A final factor concerns corporate lawyers and service companies.
Corporate lawyers across the country tend to be familiar with Delaware
law because of the state's prominence. They can thus provide advice on
Delaware law more cheaply, having to do less research. Also, service
companies such as CSC and CTC know how to deal with Delaware
corporate procedures very easily and quickly.
Not everyone is convinced that all or even any of these factors are
persuasive explanations of Delaware's dominance. 7 I find the arguments
in favor of these factors pretty persuasive, but my point in this Article is
not to enter that particular fray. Instead, I shall assume that these or other
sorts of network and learning effects do exist and are of considerable
importance in explaining Delaware's persistence as the state of choice in
which large American corporations incorporate. From here on, my
object is to analyze some possible implications of these sorts of effects.
B.

Consequences of Network and Learning Effects

Network and learning effects are specific instances of a general
phenomenon that economists often call increasing returns to scale: as the
market for a product gets larger, the per unit costs of producing it get
smaller or the per unit benefits from its use get larger.98 Products with
increasing returns often have multiple equilibria, that is, multiple
possible equilibrium outcomes which the market may achieve. 99
Let us take a classic example, typewriter keyboards." ' The
dominant keyboard used today is called QWERTY. It is, of course, not
the only possible keyboard configuration by any means. One of its few
competitors today, for instance, is called Dvorak. Keyboard patterns may
exhibit increasing returns via network effects. Consider someone
deciding what keyboard pattern to learn. They are likely to want to learn
whatever pattern is dominant, as it will be easier to find keyboards
which have that system, and offices in which they work will likely use
that system. The makers of keyboards, in turn, will want to make
keyboards which most users are familiar with, as those keyboards will be
in most demand. Once one particular system, like QWERTY, becomes
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
(1985).

See id.
See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 1,at 1069-70; Lemley & McGowan, supra note 79, at 585.
See Kamar, supra note 90, at 1923.
See id, at 1931.
See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 335

2003]

COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS

dominant, then both users and makers will go to that system; in the
extreme, it will be the only system used. Many possible systems could
have won out; each such system represents a possible equilibrium. Once
an equilibrium is reached, it may be quite difficult to move to a different
equilibrium; this feature is known as lock-in.'0 '
Which equilibrium will actually occur? It may depend on small
historical chances early on in the adoption of the systems. If by accident
one system gets a noticeable lead, users and makers may start to adopt it
more and more, increasing its lead and crowding out other systems. This2
0
feature of increasing return environments is called path dependence,'
sometimes referred to by the slogan "history matters." Part of the reason
that QWERTY has become a powerful metaphor for path-dependent
systems is Paul David's story"°3 that QWERTY became the dominant
keyboard pattern in part because early typewriter makers needed to slow
down the typing process somewhat in order to avoid jamming, and
QWERTY was slower than some of its competitors.
This story leads to another interesting feature of path-dependent
systems. The multiple equilibria can often be ranked by their
efficiency.' ° There is no assurance that the most efficient equilibrium
need necessarily be the one actually realized. Thus, if David is right,
QWERTY may be less efficient than other keyboard configurations;
indeed, it may have won out in part because of its very inefficiency,
since after all, jamming of typewriters is no longer a major problem.
Another possible feature of product markets with increasing returns is
natural monopoly-Ma Bell and the old telephone system is a classic
example.' 5 Thus, to the extent that increasing returns are a pervasive part
of many environments, markets may not be as likely to lead to efficient
outcomes as economists often like to believe. Beyond QWERTY,
economists have argued that increasing returns may be important in a
variety of other markets, including Beta versus VHS,'06 nuclear energy
plants,"" and computer operating systems. '°8

101.
102.
103.
104.

See Arthur, supra note 81, at 10.
See id. at 11.
See David, supra note 100, at 333.
See Arthur, supra note 8 1, at 10.

105.

See Kenneth H. Ryesky, Ma Bell's Legacy: Artifacts in Decedents' Estates fron

the

Forced Divestiture of American Telephone & Telegraph, 8 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 1, 18 (1992).
106. See W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCl. AM., Feb. 1990, at 92.
107. See Robin Cowan, Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-in, 50 J.
ECON. HIST. 541, 565-66 (1990).

108. See Arthur, supra note 106, at 93.
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Many parts of this general story are controversial. Leading critics of
the increasing returns story include Stan Liebowitz and Stephen
Margolis. °9 In part, their criticism is purely empirical: they claim that
many alleged instances of lock-in to an inferior equilibrium have not
been proven true, including QWERTY itself."' Moreover, they have a
number of good practical observations as to how entrepreneurs and
consumers may find strategies to avoid locking-in to inefficient
outcomes."'
Liebowitz and Margolis also raise some important theoretical
points as well. They note that lock-in to an inefficient equilibrium may
denote several different possibilities." 2 These possibilities differ
depending on the costs of switching from an achieved equilibrium."3
One product may be more efficient ex ante than another, but it could be
that once the market locks in to the less efficient product, then the costs
of switching to the better product exceed the gains from switching. They
call this second degree path dependence. ' 4 They believe that second
degree path dependence has little practical significance, because by
definition it is not worth pursuing policy options to try to move from an
equilibrium that is inefficient only in this sense." 5
Liebowitz and Margolis think the only interesting form of lock-in
to an inefficient equilibrium is what they call third degree path
'6 In this case, the switching costs of moving from an
dependence."
inefficient equilibrium are less than the benefits to be gained from the
switch. ' 7 Producers and consumers do not switch, however, because no
one person can capture enough of the gains from the switch to have
incentive to induce it, and collective action problems make it hard to
band together."8 Liebowitz and Margolis think actual cases of third
degree path dependence leading to inefficient outcomes are likely to be

Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-I, and
109. See generally S.J.
History, I I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995).

110.
(1990).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See S.J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 L. & ECON. 1,2-3
See generally id.
See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 109, at 206.
See id. at 207.
What they call first degree path dependence is uninteresting. I shall not discuss it here.
See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 109, at 207.
See id. at 214.
See id.
Seeid. at215-16.
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rare because, as mentioned above, entrepreneurs and consumers will find
ways to make superior products win out.' 9
There are some significant counter-arguments to Liebowitz and
Margolis. For one, the strategies that are alleged to help out superior
products will often of necessity depend on producers, consumers, and/or
capital providers being able to do a good job of predicting which product
will prove to be superior.'2 ° In the crucial early stages of competition,
though, those predictions may well be quite difficult and unreliable. If
market participants often guess incorrectly, there is no reason to believe
that the potentially superior product will be able to win out. It is a matter
of debate whether there are any well-established cases of an inferior
technology becoming dominant in the market. Supporters of increasing
returns notions think so; Liebowitz and Margolis disagree. The empirical
question is quite hard for at least two reasons. First, the question requires
comparison of reality with a counterfactual situation: how would an
alternative technology or regime have done had it managed to become
dominant? Measuring a counterfactual situation is not easy, to say the
least. Sometimes one can try to compare differing outcomes in differing
regions or countries, but then there are typically intervening factors
which make pure comparisons quite hard. Second, there is often room
for debate about what counts as a superior outcome. Are Macs better
than PCs? What about Windows and its competitors? VHS and Beta? In
our case, we have already seen how heated the debate is over what
counts as a good set of corporate law rules. Liebowitz and Margolis
think the burden of proof is on their opponents to clearly demonstrate
instances of sub-optimal lock-in, but it is unclear to me why that should
be so.
Second, there is some ambiguity in the concept of switching costs,
which is crucial to distinguishing second and third degree path
dependence.' 2 ' Switching costs may be purely technical, or they could
refer to the costs of organizing collective action, or they could even
include the costs due to humans being boundedly rational. If the
definition of costs is made broad enough, then third degree path
dependence becomes definitionally impossible-if people do not choose

119. By the way, this argument is really only a difference in degree from proponents of the
path dependence idea. Leading dynamic models of lock-in, for instance those of Brian Arthur,
typically find that the efficient equilibria are more likely to occur. The difference with Liebowitz
and Margolis at a theoretical level, then, may simply be how much more likely the efficient
equilibria are.
120. Seeid. at215-16.
121. See id. at 207.
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to switch from a successful alternative, it must be because the cost of
doing so, broadly construed, outweighs the benefit. Liebowitz and
Margolis do not say they are defining switching costs this way, but one
needs to beware of this tendency among defenders of the free market
faith.

'

22

Finally, Paul David has argued that Liebowitz and Margolis are
wrong to find second degree path dependence uninteresting, with few
policy implications. 3 David thinks that we may want to think of ex ante
ways to respond to the possibility of this sort of inefficient
equilibrium. 2 4 How might one do so? David suggests more subtle
policies than government trying to pick and impose a winner.'25 Rather,
we might want policies which find ways to delay the onset of lock-in.
That will give market participants more time to explore available
options. It will not guarantee that the market eventually locks in to the
best alternative, but it will increase the chances of doing so.
I will focus on this final counter-argument suggested by David. One
of my two main arguments in this Article is that competition among
states for corporate charters may be one way of slowing down the
process of locking in to a particular corporate law regime. The next
Section will explore that argument in detail. Before getting there,
though, I shall briefly examine how others have applied the idea of path
dependence, and its policy implications, in the area of corporate law.
C. Previous Work on IncreasingReturns and CorporateLaw
To date, to my knowledge, there have been two main explorations
of possible policy and welfare implications for increasing returns in
corporate law. The first came with Klausner's original contribution to
this topic. 2 6 Klausner noted that the network effect mechanisms in the
choice of corporate law may create a path-dependent system with the
potential to lock-in to an inefficient outcome. 27 Thus, we may by
accident have stumbled upon Delaware as the dominant state.'28 An
alternative corporate law regime may be superior, but is now unable to
gain market share given the network effect advantages which Delaware
122. See generally Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100
YALE L.J. 1211 (1991).
123. See Economic Processes, supra note 21.
124. See generally id.
125. See id.
126. See Klausner, supra note 19, at 849-5 1.
127. See id. at 849-50.
128. See id. at 850.
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Of course, the possibility that we may lock-in to an inefficient
corporate law regime does not mean that we have actually done so. We
may have locked-in to Delaware law, but that law may be superior to the
alternatives on offer. Klausner expresses no opinion on this point.
Moreover, if Delaware law is inefficient, Klausner is also agnostic on
the question of whether we have experienced second or third degree path
dependence; that is, he points out that the costs of switching to a
different system may exceed the benefits of doing so.' 3° Still, despite
these caveats, Klausner's argument has been taken as a serious critique
of the prevailing orthodoxy that the corporate charter competition is a
race to the top. Klausner does not discuss, though, whether his argument
justifies some sort of federal intervention in the area. In the next Section
I will be exploring the possible policy implications of Klausner's ideas.
The second leading story about possible welfare implications of
increasing returns in corporate law comes from Ehud Kamar, sometimes
writing with Marcel Kahan.' 3' Kamar notes that increasing returns may
give Delaware a significant degree of market power vis-A-vis other
states.'32 Corporations will be reluctant to switch to other states because
of the network and learning effect advantages of being in Delaware, and
so Delaware will be able to impose significant costs on those
companies.'33 In part those costs will take the form of higher
incorporation fees, a significant part of Delaware's revenue. In larger
part, though, Kamar thinks the state uses its market power to manipulate
the law to benefit the Delaware corporate bar, a powerful interest group.
In particular, he thinks the state makes its corporate law sub-optimally
vague and indeterminate. ' 4 This indeterminacy leads to greater
litigation, which benefits the corporate bar.' 3 In this Article, I will not
explore this argument further, although I will note that to the extent that
the increasing returns to Delaware are due to greater predictability
caused by more precedents, it would seem that there is a pretty strong
constraint as to how far the state would want to go in increasing
indeterminacy-too much vagueness would then risk killing the goose

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id. at 849-51.
See id. at 851.
See Kamar, supra note 90, at 1947; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 90, at 1250.
See Kamar, supra note 90, at 1923.
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See id. at 1910.
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that laid the golden egg.' 36 The indeterminacy thesis is a very hard one to
test, as both the degree of indeterminacy which actually exists is hard to
measure, and it is hard to tell what level of indeterminacy is optimal.
Some would argue, for instance, that fiduciary duty law is naturally
rather broad and fact-specific, as a major part of its point is to allow
courts to respond to the varied factual patterns which can arise and for
which it is hard to fully anticipate rules in advance. On the other hand, to
the extent that Kamar and others are right about the ambiguity of
Delaware law, that would seem to seriously limit the plausibility of
precedential clarity as a source of increasing returns.
D. Increasing Returns and Empirical Studies
The presence of increasing returns also makes it harder to test the
competing race to the bottom and race to the top stories. The main
difference between those stories is whether the state corporation laws
chosen by companies tend to benefit or harm their shareholders. A
variety of empirical studies have tried to measure this. 7 The results to
date have been mixed, although they tend to favor the race to the top
story. The evidence, already equivocal, becomes even more
indeterminate in light of possible increasing returns.
Even putting increasing returns aside, the relatively problematic
nature of existing empirical studies is already fairly well understood.
First, there is the difficulty of defining and measuring benefits to
shareholders. The leading approach to empirical studies, event studies,
identifies this with changes in share prices. Even putting aside the
contentious issue of how well share prices actually reflect the underlying
value of companies, there are well-known difficulties in pinning down
the effects of one given change in circumstances on a company's share
prices. It can be hard to determine when information about a switch in
state of incorporation becomes known to the market, and hence when the
market price changes to reflect that information.'38 It can also be hard to
136. Although Kamar's point is that reducing certainty below the optimum may help Delaware
to the extent that the reduction hurts other states more than Delaware by making it harder for them
to imitate the leader. See id. at 1930.
137. See generally Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the
Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179 (1985); Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor
State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002); Daines, supra note I; Peter
Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" Versus
FederalRegulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics
and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L.
Rev. 551 (1987).
138. See Romano, supra note 18, at 268.
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disentangle the effect of a change in the state of incorporation on the
share price from the effect of other factors. This is particularly so since
changes in the state of incorporation typically occur at times when other
major changes in a company's strategy are occurring, e.g., as a company
plans to go public or to pursue an acquisition strategy. 3 9 All existing
empirical studies are subject to extensive debate as to whether or not
they adequately control for these sorts of problems.
The possibility of increasing returns adds a whole new set of
problems for empirical studies. Consider the race to the bottom story
with increasing returns added in. The basic race to the bottom story
suggests that many, if not most, states will choose to mimic the leading
destination state for corporations. Thus, even the basic story does not
necessarily predict that shareholders will see negative returns from
incorporation in Delaware, because Delaware should not be much, if
any, worse than most other states. Add in increasing returns, and all of a
sudden it becomes quite possible, even accepting the race to the bottom
story, that shareholders will actually see positive returns from a decision
to incorporate in Delaware. If most states offer pretty much the same bad
substantive law, but Delaware offers more experienced judges, greater
predictability, and future responsiveness, then shareholders may be
better off with a devil they know and can count on, rather than the less
experienced and less competent devils of other states. Thus, positive
returns to shareholders from incorporation in Delaware is quite
consistent with the race
to the bottom thesis combined with the presence
40
of increasing returns.'
How, then, can one test between the competing theories if
increasing returns are indeed present? That is not an easy question.
Perhaps the answer is to focus on returns to incorporating in states other
than Delaware. There are a variety of states that vie with Delaware to
attract corporations to their states but which have not been as successful,
Nevada and Maryland, for instance.' 4' Some other states, on the other
hand, do not seem to have joined the race, whatever direction it is
headed in-California is a leading example.' 42 If the race is indeed to the
bottom, then one might expect to see negative shareholder returns to

139. See id. at 279 (describing how firms typically reincorporate when they are engaged in a
major change in their business).
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incorporation in the failed Delaware, as compared with the states which
lag in the race. Even this prediction is subject to some question-to the
extent that states like Nevada and Maryland attempt to mimic Delaware
closely, including following Delaware precedent, they may be able to
share some of the increasing returns Delaware creates. However,
presumably that effect must be limited, or else the increasing return story
does not work-if Nevada can capture all or most of Delaware's
increasing returns, then those returns really are not state-specific at all.
Complicating matters even further, there is a difference between the
behavior of large and small corporations. Large public corporations tend
to incorporate in Delaware, but small corporations tend to choose their
home state.143 In part this may be because there is a large fixed cost,
partly due to a higher tax burden, from choosing to incorporate in
Delaware, and this cost is worth paying only for companies with large
revenues. It may also be that lawyers in smaller firms servicing smaller
businesses are less familiar with Delaware and more familiar with local
law. It may be that the benefits of Delaware's corporate law are much
stronger for large companies. Delaware law is particularly adapted to
dealing with conflicts between the interests of managers and a large
number of dispersed shareholders. Small companies don't face this
problem, but instead face potential conflict between minority and
controlling shareholders. Delaware's large body of cases dealing with
takeovers and acquisitions, for instance, is irrelevant to closely held
corporations. These differences also make the increasing returns issue
more complicated. Every state has a significant number of corporations
incorporated in it, and thus some opportunity to gain from increasing
returns. However, very few states have many large corporations
incorporated in them, and so only Delaware, and perhaps a few others,
are able to put in place benefits particular to the interests of those large
companies.
To my knowledge, no one has done a detailed comparison of
returns to shareholders in states outside of Delaware yet. In a recent
paper, Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen find that states whose laws
44
favor anti-takeover defenses tend to do well in attracting corporations.'
However, they do not systematically ask about returns to shareholders,
although they do find that Tobin's Q has no statistically significant
effect on the incorporation decision. 45
Thus, one effect of increasing returns in corporate law is to make
143. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 27, at II, 16.
144. See id. at 27.
145. See id. at 16.
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empirical studies testing between the two leading theories in this area
even more difficult. That problem deserves attention. However, from
here on I focus on a different question, namely the policy implications
which follow if we conclude that increasing returns exist and are
relatively strong.
IV.

A MODEL OF CHARTER COMPETITION WITH INCREASING RETURNS

This Section examines how state charter competition may work as a
response to the presence of increasing returns in the choice of corporate
law. This Section first presents the logic informally, then lays out a
model which represents some of the arguments formally.
A.

Policy Implications of Increasing Returns

Both supporters and critics of increasing returns often assume that a
leading policy implication of increasing returns may be that the potential
exists for the central government to step in and correct a market
failure.' 46 There are at least two problems for charter competition in the
presence of increasing returns. The first is that a state with poor laws
may become dominant. The second is that even if a state with good laws
becomes dominant, once it has a strong enough lead competition may
give it little reason to continue to improve its laws. This Article
concentrates on the first problem, although it touches on the second at
several points. In ongoing work I consider the second problem.' 47 Either
problem may provide some justification for intervention from the central
government. To some extent, Klausner's initial work on network effects
and corporate law repeats this point that increasing returns may help
justify central government intervention.' 48 Klausner did recognize,
though, a point often made in the literature, that transition costs may
make it too costly to move from an inefficient equilibrium once that
equilibrium has been reached.' 49 He leaves that as an open empirical
question."5
Another important limit on the ability of a central authority such as
the federal government to step in and try to create a better equilibrium is
that the federal government may not know what a better equilibrium
would look like. For instance, many scholars suspect that current law in
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
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most U.S. states, including Delaware, is overly receptive to anti-takeover
defenses.'"' Would federal rules limiting such defenses, say along the
lines of the much-praised City Code in England, improve American
corporate law? Possibly they would, but there are some arguments that
hostile takeovers may sometimes be less than most corporate law
scholars believe, and that defenses against takeovers may rightly help
either target company shareholders'52 or other constituencies." 3 Are we
confident enough in our knowledge of the effects of takeovers that we
are willing to impose one law on all U.S. corporations?
For these reasons, among others, the presence of increasing returns
does not give a strong argument for imposing a federal corporations law
on all U.S. corporations. Pace Liebowitz and Margolis, though, that does
not exhaust the potential policy implications of increasing returns. As
mentioned in the previous Section, Paul David has suggested policies
which slow down the adoption of new technologies and help encourage
the market to explore more options. 1 4 This Section develops the
argument that charter competition between states may do that for
corporate law. Furthermore, this Section focuses on the effect of
increases in the number of differing corporate law systems offered.
Consider the differences in charter competition where two states
offer different corporation laws versus the case where ten states offer
different laws. If increasing returns of the sort described in the previous
Section are significant, we might expect that in both cases competition
between the states will eventually lead to lock-in to one alternative.
Moreover, it is possible that lock-in will not be to the best alternative.
One would expect some differences between the two-state and the
ten-state cases. Lock-in might take longer to occur in the ten-state case,
as during the early stages of competition different corporations explore
the different options. It would likely take longer for one particular state
to become dominant enough that corporations will start to flock to that
state. There would thus be more time in the ten-state case to determine
how well the different available corporation laws work. This is one
important reason why we may not want a national corporate law.
The ten-state case also is able to explore a greater variety of
151. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 50, at 130; Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman,
Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Searchfor Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 521, 523
(2002).
152. See Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer
Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51,52 (1982).
153. See ANDREI SHLEIFER & LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS, BREACH OF TRUST IN HOSTILE
TAKEOVERS I (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2342, 1987).
154. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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alternative approaches to corporation law. It is likely that at least one or
two of the alternatives offered in the ten-state case will be closer to the
optimal law than either alternative offered in the two-state case, although
some alternatives will likely also be worse than either in the two-state
case. As a combination of this and the greater time before lock-in, one
might expect that the state which prevails in the ten-state case is likely to
offer a better law than the state which prevails in the two-state case.
Such, at least, was my expectation when I set up the model explored
later in this Section. It turns out, though, that there are some
countervailing tendencies, which will be easier to understand once I
have set out the model.
The above speaks of "the" optimal law."'
Of course, different laws
may be better for different companies. Indeed, the model set out in the
next subsection assumes that is so. Another potential advantage of
having more states in the competition is that it will allow corporations to
pick and choose among a greater variety of options so that they can find
one closer to their own particular needs.5 6 However, the presence of
increasing returns may keep that from happening. If the advantages of
having a law chosen by many other corporations exceed the advantages
of being governed by a law particularly well-designed to benefit one's
own corporation, then one state will eventually come to dominate even
though other states may offer laws that are better for some corporations.
That is the case for the model presented in the next subsection. Or, it
may be that where increasing returns are significant but cease beyond a
certain number of incorporations, then it might be possible for two or
more states to each have enough incorporations to sustain the maximum
level of network and learning effects. On the other hand, if one state
becomes dominant early on, it may prevent any other from achieving
those effects. Thus, the number of dominant states may itself be pathdependent. I present such a case in a variant of the model in the next
subsection.
Although my main focus for this Article is the initial choice of the
dominant jurisdiction, we obviously also care whether competition has
any effects once one state wins the race. Even after lock-in has occurred,
having a greater variety of alternative jurisdictions out there may still be
valuable. In the real world (unlike the model in the next subsection), not
all corporations choose the dominant jurisdiction. Thus, experience still
155. Remember the caveat as to the meaning of "optimal" here. See supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
156. See Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L.
REV. 709, 713-17 (1987).
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accrues even for non-dominant laws. As that experience continues, and
as the business environment changes, it could be that system participants
some day discover that one of the non-dominant alternatives has actually
become superior to the dominant law. It may take a much superior law to
induce corporations to shift from the dominant law which enjoys the
advantages of increasing returns, but if a non-dominant jurisdiction can
demonstrate that it has enough of an advantage, corporations may shift.
Or, the dominant jurisdiction may modify its law to copy innovations
that have proved their worth in non-dominant states. The model of the
next subsection is not complex enough to take account of these effects,
but they are potentially important.'57
The ten-state case does present some disadvantages relative to the
two-state case. Perhaps most obviously, there may be costs to investors
and corporate lawyers, among others, from having to become familiar
with a greater variety of alternative laws. Corporate law courses would
be a lot easier to teach and take if there were just one body of law one
needed to learn, and corporate law practice would also be easier, and the
services provided correspondingly cheaper to clients.
More subtly, in the presence of increasing returns a greater time
lapse before lock-in occurs is actually costly. With significantly
increasing returns, each corporation saves on costs by choosing a body
of law widely used by other corporations. In the extreme, it is best that
all choose the same law-even if that law is not the best possible, the
benefits from uniformity may outweigh the costs of waiting to try to
determine the very best law. The longer it takes for the system to lock-in
to one alternative, the longer it takes to fully enjoy the benefits from
increasing returns. ' Moreover, more corporations will be left orphaned
(or have to engage in costly reincorporations) under laws which wind up
losing out in the competition. Furthermore, competition between many
states creates the following possible problem. With many states, one
outlier state may early on be attractive to a fair number of corporations,
even though its law is further from the optimum than those of many
other states. Nevertheless, that state's early adoption by many
corporations may cause network and learning effects to kick in, leading
the state to become dominant. The chances of success for such outlier
states may increase as the number of states increases.
Thus, there may be a trade-off. A greater number of jurisdictions in
the competition may increase the expected quality of the corporation law

157. See McDonnell, supra note 22, for work on this question.
158. See Historical Economics, supra note 21, at 3 I.
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offered by the jurisdiction which emerges as the winner of the
competition. However, more jurisdictions delays the benefits to be
received from increasing returns. It may well be that there is an
intermediate level of competition which maximizes this trade-off. With
fewer states than that level, the chances of winding up with a quite suboptimal body of law are too great. With more states than that level, the
expected final body of law is not much better (and may even be worse),
and. the delays required to achieve that better law are not worth it. The
following subsection formalizes some of these ideas.
B.

A Model of CharterCompetition

Consider the following highly simplified model of charter
competition between jurisdictions. Suppose that in choosing between
jurisdictions, the expected returns of corporations are affected by two
factors. The first is how close the law offered by a jurisdiction is to the
ideal law for that corporation. To simplify matters as much as possible, I
measure this factor as the square of the distance between the law offered
by jurisdiction j, L., and the ideal value of the law for corporation i, vi,
where both L and v, can take on any value between 0 and 1. You can
think of the law as varying on a continuum from more accommodating
to directors and officers to less accommodating, for instance. The second
factor is how many corporations have chosen to incorporate in
jurisdiction j-let NJ measure this number. The expected return FLU. to
corporation i from incorporating in jurisdiction j is
(1) IT = I - (v,- L 2 + eN
where e is a parameter which reflects the relative strength of the
increasing returns which accrue to having many corporations in one
jurisdiction.
Now imagine the following dynamic process. First, consider the
process with only two states competing. Each state chooses at random a
value of L between 0 and 1, and keeps that value through the entire
competition.'" Then, one by one new corporations enter the market, with
159. This assumption of unchanging values for jurisdictions is a serious limitation of the
model-it would clearly be of interest to extend the model by allowing jurisdictions to change their

values along the way. The assumption that states choose at random, rather than adopting an optimal
strategy, is another limitation, although recent work by Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar suggests
that this may actually be an appropriate assumption. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 22, at 724-34.
Kahan and Kamar see this as suggesting that states do not really compete for corporations at all. See
id. The model presented here shows that, even so, there may be something to gain from having a
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the optimum law v. for each new corporation chosen at random between
0 and 1. Each corporation compares n-, and 1-I
2 and chooses that
jurisdiction which offers it the higher F.6' For the very first corporation,
where N, = N2 = 0, this simply comes down to a choice as to which
jurisdiction offers a law closest to its ideal point. For future adopters,
however, the choice depends on both closeness to the corporation's ideal
point and also which state has been adopted by more corporations.
What can we say about what is likely to happen if we let this
process go on indefinitely? First, the process has two "absorbing states."
In one of these states, for all possible values of v, corporation i prefers
.161
jurisdiction I to jurisdiction 2, because N, is enough greater than N2
Once this state is reached, all corporations after that point will choose
jurisdiction 1,as with each choice its advantage over jurisdiction 2
increases. The other state is the mirror image of this one, where all
possible corporations prefer jurisdiction 2 to jurisdiction 1.j62 Given
these two absorbing states, we can say that with probability 1 the process
will eventually enter one of the absorbing states and remain in that state
thereafter. In other words, the system will eventually lock-in to one of
the two alternative jurisdictions. Thereafter, all new corporations will
choose the victorious jurisdiction.
Second, for each absorbing state there is a positive probability that
the system will lock-in to that state. To see this most simply, note that in
the first period there is a cutoff point of v,-for lower values than that,
the first corporation will choose jurisdiction 1, and for higher values it
will choose jurisdiction 2. There is a positive probability that the first v
will be below this point, and hence jurisdiction 1 will be chosen, and
similarly that the first v, will be above this point. Moreover, there is a
positive probability that for any given number of periods, each time the

variety of states offering a variety of corporate laws.
160. The assumption that a corporation chooses the jurisdiction which offers it the highest fl is
also a simplifying one which could be interestingly relaxed in future work. For learning effects, the
assumption is unproblematic-with learning effects, it is past adoptions of the jurisdiction by other
corporations which increases the value to a new adopter. However, with network effects, it is how
many corporations that will use the corporation in the future which matters. For network effects,
basing one's choice on the current number of users, rather than expected future users, is defensible
if one assumes that current use is the best available predictor of future use. This may well often be a
pretty good assumption, but a more sophisticated model would allow states to try to persuade
corporations that, although they have few users at present, they are likely to have many in the
future. For some work on strategic interaction in the presence of increasing returns, see W. Brian
Arthur & Andrzej Ruszczynski, Strategic Pricing in Markets with Increasing Returns, in
INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 159.
161. This state is reached where e(N, - N2) > (2 - L, - L2)(L2 - L,).
162. This state is reached where e(N, - N2) < L, - L,".
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value of vi chosen will be below (alternatively above) that cutoff point. If
this occurs for enough periods, then jurisdiction
1 (alternatively
63
jurisdiction 2) will be reached as a lock-in point.'
Third, consider the relative optimality of the two absorbing states.
If all corporations, beyond a certain point in time, are going to choose
the same jurisdiction, we would prefer that they choose the jurisdiction
which offers law L. which is closest to 1/2, as 1/2 minimizes the average
distance from the ideal points of all possible corporations.' However,
we have just seen that each of the jurisdictions may become dominant
with a positive probability. Thus, we can now see that there is a positive
probability that the competition will result in lock-in to an inefficient
equilibrium.
Finally, for the two-jurisdiction version of the model, it is of some
interest to ask how the dynamics vary as e varies. Intuitively, one would
expect that as e, which measures the relative importance of increasing
returns, grows larger, the process will tend to lock-in more quickly to
one of the absorbing states. Moreover, as the process gets quicker, one
expects that lock-in to the wrong equilibrium becomes more likely, and
hence the system will on average wind up further from the optimal L of
1/2 as e increases.
Proving these intuitive points analytically is quite difficult, and
beyond my ken. However, it is easier to run a number of simulations of
the model on a computer, and I have done so.' 6' For each simulation I

assigned random choices of L,and L2, then chose corporation values v, at
random, assigned the corporation to its preferred jurisdiction j, adjusted
N. accordingly, and let the simulation run until a lock-in point was
reached. For each such simulation I calculated the distance between the
winning L. and 1/2 and the number of periods elapsed before lock-in. I
ran 200 such simulations for each of ten values of e.
The results are presented in the first rows of Tables 1 and 2. Table 1
presents the average time to lock-in for each of the ten values of e (and
for each of ten different number of states-for the moment, concentrate

163. There are many other ways to reach either absorbing states, of course-the way noted in
the text is just one.
164. Recall that the ideal points for firms in this model, that is, the law that a firm would most
like to operate under, vary uniformly from 0 to I. Since over time one would expect the actual
distribution of ideal points to come to resemble this distribution from which the firms are drawn, if
there is only going to be one state law offered in the end, one would like that law to minimize the
average distance from the ideal points of the firm population. Given a uniform distribution of firm
ideal points over 0 to 1,a state law of 1/2 is the value which minimizes the average distance.
165. Or rather, my research assistant John Hutchins has done so. I extend many thanks to John.
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on the case of two states, the first row.' 66 The pattern is as predicted-for
higher values of e, lock-in tends to occur more quickly. Table 2 presents
the average distance from 1/2 of the winning L for each of the ten values
of e.'67 The results are roughly as predicted, with the distance from 1/2
tending to increase as e increases.
The next step is to expand the number of jurisdictions from 2 to 3
or more. Now, there is one absorbing state (i.e., a possible lock-in
equilibrium) for each jurisdiction. As before, there is a positive
probability for each jurisdiction that the process will lock-in to it.
The more interesting question is, for a given e, what happens to the
average time to lock-in and the average distance of the winning LJ from
1/2 as the number of jurisdictions increases? As argued in the previous
Section, I expected that as the number of jurisdictions increased the
average time to lock-in would increase and the average distance from
1/2 would decrease. Again, it is quite hard to prove this analytically, but
we can test out the argument with computer simulations.
The results are presented in the remaining rows of Tables 1 and 2.
These tables show the results for two to ten state versions of the model,
and for fifty states (the latter to give a sense of what happens as the
number of states gets pretty big, and, of course, because it is the number
of states in the U.S.). Each cell represents the average value from 200
simulations. The results for time to lock-in are as predicted-see Table
1. As the number of states grows, the average time to lock-in clearly
tends to increase.
Next, consider Table 2, which presents the results for average
distance of the winning laws from the optimal law of 1/2. First, note one
major point. If we just had one state law, and chose that law at random
between 0 and 1, the expected distance of that state law from 1/2 would
be 0.25. Every cell in Table 2 has a value lower than 0.25. Thus, in every
set of simulations with more than one state, the average performance is
better than for just choosing one law at random. Some competition is
better than none at all.
But is more competition better than less? The results in Table 2 as
the number of states increases are less clear and more random than those
in Table 1. However, there seems to be a modest tendency for the
average distance from 1/2 to increase as the number of states increases.
That is, the process tends to become less accurate as the degree of
competition increases.

166. See infra Table I.
167. See infra Table 2.
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Why might this be? Consider the results in one of the simulations
with ten states. The state values chosen at random were 0.14694,
0.356031, 0.36532, 0.484745, 0.490486, 0.629745, 0.634263, 0.71964,
0.748907, and 0.87056. The value closest to 1/2 is therefore 0.484745.
But the state which actually won out was that with a value of 0.14694the lowest state value. Before lock-in, 35 corporations adopted that state,
17 adopted the state at the other extreme, with value 0.87056, and only
one corporation adopted the state with the optimal law. Why did this
happen? Note that the winning state is further from its nearest
competitors than the optimal state. Thus, there is a greater chance that
early corporations will choose it-it has a bigger basin of attraction in
which it is the most preferred corporation than any other state at the
beginning. What is rewarded is not offering a law closest to the
optimum, but rather having a good niche where many early adopting
corporations will prefer your law.
If that is so, then why aren't the results simply random, with an
expected distance from 1/2 of 0.25? There seems to be at least some
reward for being close to the center. Suppose a state is deciding where to
locate its law,' 68 and it is choosing between 0.95 and 0.90. If there are
only a few competing states, then choosing an extreme point like 0.95
does not make much sense. At such an extreme point, the state
automatically limits how many corporations will prefer it-there are
only a few possible corporations with values even higher than 0.95. By
choosing 0.90 rather than 0.95, the state will gain some corporations
with lower values of v, and will probably still be the most preferred state
of the corporations with high values. However, if there are many
competitors-say 1000-then the move from 0.95 to 0.90 is unlikely to
help much-the state will pick up some corporations with lower v
values, but it will likely lose corporations with higher values because,
with so many competing states, at least one of them is likely to offer an
even higher value. Thus, as the number of competing states increases,
the penalty to states with extreme values tends to decrease. This suggests
that as the number of states gets quite large, the expected distance from
1/2 may actually tend to approach 0.25-the same value as with no
competition at all.
The logic just sketched out resembles a result from a different area
of economics, but with a similar formal model. There is a fairly welldeveloped literature on the optimal location of shops. 69 This literature
168. But remember, in this simple model states do not choose where to locate; their values are
simply assigned.
169. See Martin J. Osborne & Carolyn Pitch ik, The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model,
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assumes a uniform distribution of consumers along a straight line."'
In
the simplest version, prices are fixed, and so, given positive
transportation costs, consumers will go to the closest shop. If each shop
owner chooses where to locate simultaneously, how will they choose?
The results are somewhat varied based on particular assumptions and the
number of shops. However, if one focuses on symmetric mixed
strategies with three or more shops, it turns out that the owners will
choose a spot at random within a set distance from the center. As the
number of shops expands, the distance from the center within which
owners will locate also expands. In the limit, with an infinite number of
shops, owners will choose randomly along the entire line. 7' The intuition
is the same as the previous paragraph: more extreme choices become
more attractive as the number of competitors increases. This literature,
by the way, provides a possible basis for modifying this Article's model
to allow for states choosing optimally how to set their laws, rather than
having those laws set at random. At any rate, the results in Table 2
suggest that some competition is better than none, but much competition
may be worse than a little, and perhaps in the extreme an infinite amount
of competition (an infinite number of states) may be no better than no
competition at all.
One possible complaint about this model is that it assumes that
network or learning effects increase constantly with the number of
corporations choosing a state. One might instead think that these effects
tail off beyond a certain point. A variant of the model making such an
assumption yields a few interesting results. Suppose that for each state
the expected return to incorporating in that state is as given in (1) above,
except that the network effect term is capped at some level N*. That is,
the expected return 1I to corporation i from incorporating in jurisdiction

j is now
(2) IT = I - (v, - L) + e*nin(N, N*).
What will happen to the dynamic process sketched out above given
this change in payoffs? It depends on how large N* is. Consider for
simplicity the two-state case. One possibility is that N* is small enough
so that even if N* corporations are incorporated in one state and 0 in the
other state, some potential corporations would still prefer to incorporate
27 INT'L ECON. REV. 223, 223-24 (1986); A. Shaked, Existence and Computation of Mixed Strategy
Nash Equilibriumfor 3-Firms Location Problem, 31 J. INDUS. ECON. 93, 93 (1982).

170.
171.

See Osborne & Pitchik, supra note 169, at 223.
See id. at 224-25.
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in the state that currently has no corporations. ' In that case, given
enough time more than N* corporations will choose both states, since
even if one state were to get the first N* corporations, there is still an
interval of potential corporations which would choose the other state,
and given enough time a new entrant corporation will be chosen from
that interval at least N* times. Once each state has at least N*
corporations, the network term no longer affects a corporation's choice
of jurisdiction, since each state then has the same network term. From
thereon, each new corporation will simply choose the jurisdiction which
offers the law closest to its ideal point.
. The other main possibility is that N* is larger, so that either state
could achieve lock-in.17 In that case, several possible outcomes may
occur. One possibility is that state 1 (alternatively, state 2) could achieve
enough of an early lead that all possible corporations prefer it before it
has reached N*. Then lock-in to state 1 (alternatively, state 2) occurs.
The other possibility is that both states remain close enough in number
of early incorporations that both states reaches N* corporations without
achieving lock-in. Then neither state will achieve lock-in, and the longrun equilibrium will have corporations choosing between the two states
based only on the difference of the states' laws from the corporations'
ideal points. Thus, the number of states which continue to attract
corporations is itself path-dependent in this variant of the model.
Moreover, we can say which of these two possible outcomes is
socially preferable, at least in the long run. Compare the case where state
I achieves lock-in to that where both states have more than N*
corporations. All corporations who choose state I (after lock-in has
occurred) in the two-states-remain case are as well off as corporations
with the same ideal point in the one-state-dominates case, since they are
governed by the same law and have the same network effect N*.
Corporations who choose state 2 in the two-states-remain case, though,
are better off than corporations with the same ideal point in the onestate-dominates case, since the state in which they have incorporated is
closer to their ideal point and they have the same network effect N*.
Thus, the case which offers more variety is socially preferred, yet it may
not occur if one state manages
to achieve lock-in and block the other
74
state from ever reaching N*.1
172. Considering the expression in note 161, state I will not be able achieve lock-in if eN* <
(2 - L, - L2)(L - L,). The comparable expression for state 2, given note 162, is eN* > L2 - L,'.
173. That is, both inequalities in note 172 are reversed. Actually, there are two intermediate
cases where one of those inequalities is reversed but not the other.
174. This welfare analysis requires two caveats. First, without reincorporation, some
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This formal model, with or without the cap on N, is of course quite
simple and misses out on a number of important issues. Future
modifications would be desirable to deal with some of those issues.
Some of these have already been mentioned. For instance, the model
assumes that each jurisdiction sticks with the same law once it is chosen
at the beginning of the process. 7 In fact, jurisdictions regularly tinker
with their laws, and sometimes engage in major reforms. Most
importantly, they seem to copy what other states are doing. 7 6 How
would allowing for periodic innovation and imitation by the jurisdictions
change the results? Would it delay or speed up lock-in? Would it make
the expected resulting laws better or worse? The answers to these
questions are not obvious, although, as we shall see in the next Section,
in the history of American corporate law, imitation by states seems to
have speeded up the process of lock-in and to have led to a less full
exploration of alternative legal approaches.'77
Another limitation is that, in choosing between states, corporations
take account of increasing returns simply by comparing how many
corporations have currently chosen each jurisdiction. A richer model
would allow corporations to predict the future distribution of
incorporations between states, and in turn allow jurisdictions to pursue
strategies which try to affect those predictions. This would allow for a
richer analysis of the strategy of competition between states.
The model also assumes away switching by corporations which
have already chosen to incorporate in a state. How high switching costs
are may be an important factor in determining the strength of network
effects and other sources of increasing returns. High switching costs
make companies more likely to stick with their initial pick, thus possibly
increasing the strength of increasing returns. On the other hand, low
switching costs make companies more prone to switch to a state even if
it offers only a small advantage over its competitors. That might increase
the market share of a leading state even if the gains from increasing
returns are only modest. More formal modeling of switching costs might
help to sort out such competing possible effects.
corporations which chose their state before both states reached N* may be stuck with their less
preferred state. Second, one disadvantage of the two-states-remain case may be that it could take

longer for both states to reach N* than for just one state to achieve lock-in and reach N*. Thus, for
some period of time the one-state-dominates case may achieve greater network benefits than the
two-states-remain case. If one discounts the future highly enough, it is possible that this effect could
dominate the long-run benefits to the two-states-remain case analyzed in the main text.
175. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
176. See infra
note 200 and accompanying text.
177. See infra
notes 200-17 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the model may understate the case for increased
competition in the following way. In the model, as the number of states
increases, there is less and less advantage to states located near 1/2. In
part, this is because each new corporation comes in with a preferred
value v chosen randomly between 0 and 1. That may be fine if we
assume that corporations simply differ in underlying characteristics, and
hence in what law is best for them. However, part of the differences
between corporations may be differences in what they perceive is the
best law. Early on, guesses as to the best law may be random. As
corporations gain more experience, though, they may find that some
laws work better and some worse. If 1/2 is really better in a fundamental
way, then such learning may make later corporations more inclined to
prefer to be close to 1/2. Thus, collective learning over time may tend to
push later-adopting corporations to prefer values closer to 1/2. A more
complicated model would try to capture that effect.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the model is overly static
and lopsided in that once a jurisdiction has locked-in to dominance,
every corporation thereafter will choose that jurisdiction. No further
development occurs thereafter. Thus, it only addresses the first major
problem facing charter competition with increasing returns, namely
choosing the state with the best law in the first place. It does not address
the second problem, namely that increasing returns may reduce the
effectiveness of competition in inducing continuing legal innovation and
improvement.178 In reality, all fifty states continue to have some
corporations incorporate under their laws-a fact not explained by the
over-simplified model presented here." 9 In particular, smaller
corporations which do most of their business in one state tend to
incorporate in that state. Thus, each state continues to extend and adapt
its corporate law.' 80 It is possible at any point either that one state could
come up with a major innovation that is substantively much more
attractive than Delaware, or that the business environment could
suddenly change in a way that makes another state's law much more
attractive than Delaware. Thus, a real advantage of charter competition
not captured by this model is that it maintains some incentives for legal
innovation even after a form of lock-in has occurred. Of course,
Delaware could always respond to such change by adapting its own law
178.
179.
180.
The fact
their law

See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
See Bar-Gill, supra note 140, at 24-25 for some explanations of this pattern.
However, as noted above, the needs of small and large corporations vary significantly.
that states other than Delaware still have plenty of small, non-public corporations using
may be of little help in developing their law to attract large corporations.
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and thereby retaining its market share, but in that case the legal change
has still occurred. Evolutionary models may help to model such
effects.' In such a model states could periodically change the laws they
offer, or the external environment could periodically change. One state
would be dominant, but other states would continue to be chosen by
some corporations-perhaps, e.g., because there are advantages to
incorporating in the state in which the company's main business is
conducted. If either non-dominant states change enough, or if the
business environment changes enough, the dominant state could lose its
lead. How much change is "enough" to cause a switch would depend, in
part, on the strength of network effects-the stronger those effects, the
more change it would take to cause a switch.
The ease of change may also depend on the source of lock-in.
Consider, for instance, lock-in due to precedent and predictability. ' 12 To
the extent that this is a network effect, due to the expectation that
Delaware will remain the dominant state, it may be possible to
coordinate a shift in expectation..3 and shift to a different state, perhaps
with a quite different law. To the extent that there is instead a learning
effect based on learning how the Delaware approach works in specific
instances, it may be easier for another state to beat Delaware by
following its precedent, but harder
for another state to beat Delaware by
84
offering a quite different law.
All these limitations (and, I'm sure, more I have not thought of)
show that there is much more interesting work to be done on the
dynamics of state charter competition in the presence of increasing
returns. We have just started to scratch the surface. Even the simple
model presented here, though, suggests an interesting picture. Some
competition may be better than none in pushing to the best possible law.
Too much competition, though, may be worse than a little competition.
This pattern may or may not hold as other effects are added in, but it
does show the need to exercise care in thinking through these questions.

181.

See Robert Axelrod,

THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION:

COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION

AGENT-BASED MODELS OF

(1997), for a good discussion of some emerging evolutionary

models in social science.
182. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
183. SeeArthur, supra note 81, at 16-17.
184. See McDonnell, supra note 22, for further thought on state competition after lock-in has
occurred.
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V.

THE HISTORY OF DELAWARE'S DOMINANCE

The argument of the previous Section suggests that we should be
quite interested in how Delaware came to its position of dominance. Did
it have a number of active competitors? How different were the
alternatives its competitors offered? How long did it take for Delaware
to achieve a position of clear dominance? Does Delaware seem to be
maintaining or increasing its lead? Have other states continued to offer
alternatives since Delaware became dominant, and how have
corporations responded to those alternatives?
This Section briefly explores some of those questions by looking at
the history of Delaware's position in corporate law. It divides that
history into three Sections. The first Section considers the beginning of
modern corporate law, when New Jersey rather than Delaware was the
early innovator and market leader. The second Section considers how
Delaware stole the lead from New Jersey and became the leading
destination for incorporation by large companies. The third Section
considers developments since Delaware became the dominant state.
These are followed by a sub-Section on the nationalist element in U.S.
corporate governance, namely federal securities law. This Section
concludes with some reflections on lessons we can learn from the
history.
A.

New Jersey and the Early Years

New Jersey, not Delaware, took the early lead in the corporate
charter competition.'85 In a series of revisions from 1888 to 1896, New
Jersey offered perhaps the first modern corporation law.'8 6 It was the first

or an early pioneer in offering features such as the following:
87
it set no minimum or maximum amount for paid-in capital;'
corporations could hold shares of other corporations;

88

corporations could merge; 89
where corporations issued shares in exchange for property, the
185. See Grandy, supra note 2, at 677-78.
186. Seeid.at681.
187. See Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation Law of 1899, 1
DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 265 (1976).
188. See id. at 266.
189. See id. at 265.
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judgment of the directors was taken as conclusive as to the value
of that property, allowing for the creation of watered shares;' 90
corporations were given much scope to issues shares with varied
voting rights and powers;19'
the corporate charter 92could provide for perpetual existence, with
no need for renewal;'
the corporation could state that it existed to pursue any lawful
purpose;'93 and
New Jersey corporations were allowed to operate outside the
state without explicit permission."'
These innovations, grouped together, helped lead to a huge leap of
incorporation in New Jersey. From 1880 to 1896, 15 corporations with95
authorized capital exceeding $20 million incorporated in New Jersey.'
From 1897 to 1904, 104 corporations that size incorporated in New
Jersey.91 6 The filing fees and franchise tax gathered as a result were a big
boon to the state government's finances. Revenue from these two
sources was more than 60 percent of the state's receipts.' 97 By 1902,
New Jersey had eliminated both its debt and the state property tax."'
New Jersey's laws helped support the great merger wave which
swept the U.S. at the turn of the century.' 99 In industry after industry,
many companies merged to create large national corporations which
dominated their industries. The modern American economy took shape
at that time.
Other states saw New Jersey's success and decided to try to horn in
on a piece of the action. Those states passed laws similar to those of
New Jersey, and tried to compete by offering lower tax rates than New
Jersey. States following such a strategy included West Virginia,

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See id. at 266.
See id.
See id. at 265.
See id.
See Grandy, supra note 2, at 681.
See Seligman, supra note 187, at 267.
See id.
See Grandy, supra note 2, at 68!, 683.
See id. at 683; Seligman, supra note 187, at 267.
See Grandy, supra note 2, at 681; Seligman, supra note 187, at 268.
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Maryland, Maine, New York, and-ultimately the most successfulDelaware. Still, New Jersey had the early lead.2°°
National opposition to the merger wave, and to New Jersey's new
role in corporate law, grew. Many citizens and politicians were worried
about both the threat of monopoly and the sheer size of some of the new
corporations. A movement grew for antitrust laws to limit the ability of
the new corporations to monopolize industry. 0' At the national level, this
led to the Sherman Antitrust Act in 18902 and to the Clayton Act in
1914.203 Such activism also sought action at the state level-and changed
the face of the corporate charter race. 204
B.

Delaware Takes the Lead

Shortly before Woodrow Wilson became President in 1912, New
Jersey faltered in the race. Wilson made his reputation as a trustbuster,
and he was embarrassed nationally by his failure to take on the trusts
which had made New Jersey their home. Thus, near the end of his term
as governor of New Jersey, he proposed major changes to New Jersey
law to rein in the perceived abuses encouraged by New Jersey's
permissive corporate law. The resulting legislation was known as the
Seven Sisters. 25 Among other things, the new laws prohibited
corporations from buying stock in other corporations with a view
towards controlling them, and they required that if a corporation issued
stock for property then the property must be fully equivalent to the
money value of the stock. The laws put in place a variety of other
measures to limit monopolization by New Jersey corporations.2 °
The Seven Sisters lived a short life. By 1917, New Jersey had
repealed most of them. 20 7 But five years was long enough to forever
change the landscape of American corporate law. Corporate managers
hated the Seven Sisters, and they looked to reincorporate elsewhere.
Delaware, with its law resembling pre-Seven Sisters New Jersey, turned
out to be the state to which more moved than any other. Delaware had
now taken the lead in the charter competition race. 2"0 Even after New

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See Grandy, supra note 2, at 685; Seligman, supra note 187, at 269.
See Grandy, supra note 2, at 686-87.
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2001).
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2001); see also Seligman, supra note 187, at 263-64.
See Grandy, supra note 2, at 686-87.
See id. at 687-89.
See id. at 689.
See id.
See id. at 685, 689; Seligman, supra note 187, at 272.
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Jersey had repealed its reforms, corporations no longer trusted the
political environment in that state. Delaware appears to have learned
from New Jersey's mistake-it has not repeated it, and retained its
lead.2
C. Subsequent Developments
The situation did not simply freeze once Delaware took the lead.
Other competitors have emerged over the years. Most states gradually
developed enabling-type statutes which generally resemble that of
Delaware. 2 0 Most important, perhaps, is not any particular state, but

rather the development of the Model Business Corporation Act
("MBCA"). The MBCA was drafted by a committee of the American
Bar Association. A tentative first version was released in 1946, and a
more final one in 1950.2 ' Revisions continued thereafter, with a major
re-writing in 1984. The MBCA was modeled on the Illinois Business
Corporation Act more than any other, with many of the drafters of the
Illinois Act involved in writing the MBCA.2 The MBCA has actually
been more successful than Delaware in terms of adoption by states: at
least thirty-one states have substantially adopted a version of the MBCA,
while only four other states largely follow Delaware.2 3 This is probably
because the MBCA has a clearer logical structure and language.
Delaware's advantage today comes largely through its courts, not the
Delaware

law

itself.2

4

However,

large

corporations

still

choose

Delaware over the MBCA 2. This also fits with the pattern, described
earlier, of different behavior in incorporation for small versus large
companies.
Although in structure and exact language Delaware and the MBCA
are quite different, in actual substance they are pretty close. There are
some differences of note. The MBCA has much different rules
governing legal capital; the MBCA has a universal demand requirement
before instituting a derivative suit; major changes such as mergers may
be approved by fewer shareholders under the MBCA than under
209.
210.
211.
(1956).
212.
213.
Business
(2000).
214.
215.

See Grandy, supra note 2, at 685, 689; Cary, supra note 4, at 664.
See Seligman, supra note 187, at 269-70.
See Whitney Campbell, The Model Business Corporation Act, 6 Bus.

LAW.

98, 98-99

See id. at 100-02.
See Michael P. Dooley & Michael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons Between the Model
Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 737, 738
See id. at 764-65.
See supra note 1.
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Delaware law; and there are a variety of other differences as well. 2 6 The
similarities generally swamp the differences, however, and many of the
differences can be explained as the MBCA attempting to codify common
law approaches followed in Delaware but also provide clearer legislative
guidance. This responds to the fact that most states adopting the MBCA
will have relatively few corporate law cases, and thus must rely
primarily on statutory language rather than case law. 2 7
The MBCA makes it easier for states with limited resources and
few corporations to update their corporate laws, a hard technical task. It
thereby puts some more pressure on Delaware to improve its laws, as
other states look more attractive than they would without the MBCA. On
the other hand, the MBCA also probably decreases the variety in
corporate law experiments, reducing the chances of finding good new
mutations. Its effects on continuing competition and legal evolution are
thus quite complicated.2 8
A few individual states have also remained or emerged as
competitors with Delaware, with some limited success. Nevada has
attempted to become the Delaware of the west. In some ways it offers
2' 9
laws that are even more pro-management than those of Delaware.
Should Delaware stumble in the way New Jersey did, it is quite possible
that Nevada would become the new leader. However, to date Delaware
has not stumbled.
Despite this competition, Delaware has maintained and even
increased its lead. The pattern has not been completely steady. In the
sixties, Delaware seemed to be slipping somewhat. In response, the
legislature initiated a thorough overhaul, resulting in the new Delaware
General Corporation Law of 1967.220 The preamble to the law creating
the commission which led to the new law is quite explicit about the
goals and perceived pressure Delaware faced:
WHEREAS, the State of Delaware has a long and beneficial history as
the domicile of nationally known corporations; and
WHEREAS, the favorable climate which the State of Delaware has
traditionally provided for corporations has been a leading source of
revenue for the State; and

216. See Dooley & Goldman, supra note 213, at 739-56.
217. See id. at 765.
218. For further elaboration, see McDonnell, supra note 22.
219. See David Mace Roberts & Rob Pivnick, Tale of the Corporate Tape: Delaware, Nevada
and Texas, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 45, 47 (2000).
220. See Seligman, supra note 187, at 279.
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WHEREAS, many States have enacted new corporation laws in recent
years in an effort to compete with Delaware for corporate business;
and
WHEREAS, there has been no comprehensive revision of the
Delaware Corporation Law since its enactment in 1898 [sic]; and
WHEREAS, the General Assembly of the State of Delaware declares it
to be the public policy of the State to maintain a favorable business
climate and to encourage corporations to make Delaware their
domicile.22 '

Since then, Delaware has made continual revisions to its law. These

are mostly small and technical, 2 with an occasional major innovation,
such as the addition of a provision223 allowing corporations to protect
directors from personal liability for certain fiduciary violations in
1986.224 During this time Delaware has retained its lead.225
D. The NationalistElement: Securities Law
Not all American corporate law is set through a decentralized
federalist process. Much of securities law works as an important
complement to state corporate law. Disclosure to shareholders is mainly
governed by federal securities law. Disclosure often has important

governance implications-breaches of fiduciary duty, for instance, are
less likely the more visible they are to investors. The Williams Act

constrains corporate takeover attempts.2 6 Federal proxy rules structure
shareholder voting in public companies.227 Misbehavior by corporate
executives is at least as likely to be the subject of securities class actions
as of state shareholder derivative suits-witness the response to the
Enron debacle, for instance.228 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has
furthered the nationalization of corporate law. For instance, the Act bans
221. See id. at 280 (quoting Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation
Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969)).
222. See id. at 283.
223. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
224. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer
Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1210 (1987).
225. See Cary, supra note 4, at 664; Grahdy, supra note 2, at 689.
226. See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1038-41 (5th
ed. 2000).
227. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2002).
228. For example, see the suit filed by the leading securities plaintiffs' law firm, Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP, at their web site, http://securities.milberg.com.
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most loans to corporate officers and directors, a matter formally decided
at the state level.
Once, securities law was also a matter of state regulation. Indeed,
most states still do have their own blue sky securities laws. However,
with the passage of the Securities Act of 193329 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,23 o the weight of securities regulation shifted

decisively to the federal government. With the passage of the National
Securities Market Improvement Act in 1996,23 federal law preempted
state securities law in many transactions, making state blue sky laws
even more marginal.232 Today, American securities law is essentially set
by Congress and the SEC. Regulatory competition may still exist, but it
is competition between nations, not among American states. As a result,
American corporate law is a complex tangle of national and state rules.
National law is important not only for what it does, but also for what it
could do. Some argue that Delaware is sometimes prodded to protect
shareholders more than it otherwise might for fear that otherwise the
federal government will step in.233 Making the tangle even more
complex, important elements of corporate governance are also set by the
national securities exchanges, especially the New York Stock Exchange
and the NASDAQ National Market. For instance, one important part of
the reaction to recent corporate scandals has been proposals to
strengthen the various rules for tested companies. Elements of
competition are important in how the competing exchanges set those
standards, but the SEC also plays a strong role in approving exchange
rules and pressuring for changes in them.
E. Some Lessons
We can draw a few tentative lessons from this history. First, there
was a fair amount of competition for dominance in corporate law in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In terms of the model of
Section IV, perhaps there was too much competition, since more than
two states may be too much. However, Section IV presented many
reasons outside the formal model why more competition may be
229. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000).
230. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000).
231. Pub. L. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996).
232. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 19-22
(4th ed. 2001).
233. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 22; Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition 12-18
(Harvard Law Sch. Public Law Research Paper No. 49) at http://ssrn.comabstractid=354783
(November 2002).
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healthier than the model suggests."' Moreover, while there was much
competition in terms of number of states, there was much less
competition in terms of legal variations. Most states which wanted to
attract corporations followed the New Jersey model quite closely . 5
There were variations, in part due to lags in adopting the different
elements of the New Jersey approach, but these variations were
relatively small.
Also, the time to lock-in seems to have been pretty quick. New
Jersey emerged as the clear leader very quickly after it started following
a chartermongering strategy. After New Jersey left the race, Delaware
216
emerged very quickly as the new leader. From Section IV, we see that
the effects of this speed are ambiguous. On the one hand, quick lock-in
allows corporations to realize the gains from learning and network
effects quickly. On the other hand, quick lock-in reduces the amount of
social learning which occurs, as we learned little about how possible
models much different from that of New Jersey might fare.
Finally, even after lock-in occurred, competition does seem to have
put some pressure on the leader to continue to offer laws which
corporations want. Most dramatically, when New Jersey passed the
Seven Sisters it utterly lost its lead, never to regain it.237 More subtly,
Delaware has pretty explicitly felt pressure to continue to adapt its law to
changing circumstances or else face the loss of its market position.238
Thus, even in the presence of network and learning effects, lock-in is not
necessarily a one-time, permanent occurrence. Even with a dominant
state, competition continues, and that competition constrains how the
dominant state can behave.239
VI.

CONCLUSION

What can we conclude, given our present state of knowledge of the
state charter competition process? Do we know enough to make any
helpful policy suggestions? In this Section, I conclude that we know
very little, but that this very lack of knowledge may provide some
reasons for a course of action-or, rather, inaction.
Even on the long-debated matter of the incentives facing corporate
decision makers, we have very little resolution of the debate. The
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
See McDonnell, supra note 22.
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theoretical arguments for both the race to the bottom and the race to the
top are strong; theory gives us no basis for choosing between the
alternative stories.240 The empirical evidence, too, is inconclusive. 4
Indeed, as I argued in Section III, given the presence of significant
network effects, it is very hard to see how any empirical evidence could
adequately distinguish between the alternatives. 242 The debate ultimately
hinges on a counterfactual: is there an alternative path which corporate
law could have followed which would have led to a more efficient
outcome? Comparing real-world law with hypothetical alternatives is
never likely to lead to clear conclusions. And yet, comparison of actual
Delaware law to other actual alternatives is inherently unsatisfactory
because the fact of Delaware's dominance importantly skews the
comparison. For purposes of simplicity, in the model of Section IV this
Article implicitly assumed that corporate decision makers make the best
choice for the corporation, given the environment. However, I personally
do not believe that assumption is true. It does seem quite possible to me
that the incentives of corporate decision makers diverge from the
interests of shareholders. I cannot prove it, however.
Unsurprisingly, we are currently on even more shaky ground when
it comes to issues that have only been raised more recently in the debate.
For instance, we do not really know whether network effects of the kind
described by Klausner and others really even exist in corporate law, or if
they do exist, whether they are of a significant size and importance.
Assuming that such effects do exist, we have even less developed ideas
about appropriate policy responses in the face of those effects.
This Article has tried to open a dialogue on that last question. It has
considered whether allowing competition between states for corporate
charters is a good idea in the face of network effects. The formal model
presented in Section IV tentatively suggests that some competition is
better than none, but that, at least at some point, more competition may
not be better than less. However, Section IV also laid out a large number
of effects and mechanisms not accounted for in the simple model. What
policy suggestions will look appealing once those effects are accounted
for is, right now, quite unclear.2 43 How these questions interact with the
traditional focus on the incentives facing corporate decision makers is, if
anything, even more unclear.
240. See supra notes 28-75 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part III.D.
243. See McDonnell, supra note 22, for further work on how increasing returns affect
competition after some form of lock-in has occurred.

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:681

If I am right about the current state of scholarship concerning
charter competition, what implications follow for making policy
recommendations? How are we to go about making policy if, as I
believe, we are so lacking in any clear empirical understanding of the
practical consequences of different policies? I do not think that question
is unique to this particular area. In fact, I think it is a quite ubiquitous
and profound problem.244
I do not have a well worked out general answer to this general
problem. However, we might seek some help from a general principle
endorsed by thinkers as diverse as Edmund Burke and John Maynard
Keynes.245 Where the effects of a policy innovation are highly uncertain
and potentially large, we should be reluctant to pursue that innovation
unless its expected benefits greatly outweigh its expected costs. As long
as the present is not too terribly bad, taking a risk on changing the
system is not worth it where the change may lead to some improvement,
but may instead lead to a serious worsening of the situation. I do not
want to push this point too far. After all, most realistically possible
changes to U.S. corporate law are unlikely to have catastrophically bad
effects. Moreover, recent scandals suggest that our current situation may
not be all that enviable. Some changes may be worth trying. Burke and
Keynes were both reformers, after all.
But, where some change is advisable, a change that retains
flexibility and does not trample on existing institutions too severely is
frequently best. To the extent that reform can preserve most of the
plausible benefits of our current mixed national/state system, it should
strive to do so. The hard balancing act is to achieve the benefits of
increasing returns, maintain some spur to evolution for the leading state,
and also correct for any possible race to the bottom problems due to the
misaligned incentives of corporate managers. This Article suggests some
ways in which our current mixed national/state system balances those
goals in a plausibly attractive way, although large gaps remain in our
244. See Brett H. McDonnell, The Curious Incident of the Workers in the Boardroom, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 503, 527-28 (2001)

(reviewing EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,

Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 2000).
245. See ROBERT SKIDELSKY, I JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: HOPES BETRAYED, 1883-1920, at
154-57 (1983), for a discussion of an unpublished essay by Keynes, "The Political Doctrines of
Edmund Burke." A key passage from Keynes's essay is as follows:
Our power of prediction is so slight, it is seldom wise to sacrifice a present evil for a
doubtful advantage in the future. Burke ever held, and held rightly, that it can seldom be
right to sacrifice the well-being of a nation for a generation, to plunge whole
communities in distress, or to destroy a beneficent institution for the sake of a supposed
millenium in the comparatively remote future.
Id. at 155.
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understanding. Before adopting any alternative, we must ask why, given
our current knowledge, we would expect that alternative to balance those
goals better than the current system.
Let us apply these ideas to several proposals in the area of
federalism and corporate and securities law in the U.S. A perennial
suggestion is that all corporations be required to incorporate under a
federal corporate law. 46 This Article has argued that the network effects
critique of state competition does not give a good reason for such a
national law. Still, if one believes the race to the bottom story that
corporate decision makers face quite poor incentives which cause them
to incorporate under laws which hurt shareholders, that suggestion may
appear attractive. However, it is not at all clear how true the race to the
bottom story is. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the federal
government, or anyone else, really knows what an optimal, or even
significantly better, corporate law would look like. Even if we knew
what the law should be, there is much doubt whether Congress and the
SEC (or a new federal agency) would have the proper incentive to adopt
that law. Lack of competition would make the federal government less
responsive than Delaware to changes in the business environment. The
total package in Delaware, including its experienced judiciary, may well
be much better than what the federal government could offer; the
nationalist procedure carries risk of major losses. Since the current
American system seems to be doing decently well, at least as a way of
protecting shareholders, compared with any other country in the world,247
it seems to me that the case for the major change of federal chartering is
as yet quite unproved. Moreover, there appears to be little political
constituency for such a change. There may well be a link between the
two: if the current situation were bad enough that such a major change
were indeed desirable, a political constituency for such change might
very well appear.

246. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE
FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 71-85 (1976).

247. 1 must admit to rather less confidence in this claim today, post-Enron, WorldCom, etc.,
than 1 had when I started work on this Article. But I still think it holds. The U.S. looks worse today
than it once did, but it is hard to say that any other country looks clearly better. The U.S. does not
have a monopoly on corporate scandals. For arguments against any need for strong new regulation
post-Enron, see Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to CorporateFraud: A Critique
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. (Ill. Law & Econ. Working Papers Series,
Working Paper No. LE02-008, 2002) available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=332681 (October
2002); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reforn (And It
Might Just Work), 36 U. CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
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A related change, floated by Cary in his seminal article, is for
national minimum corporate law standards.2 8 For instance, the national
government could set minimum fiduciary duties which all officers and
directors must follow, regardless of the state of incorporation of their
company. 49 If the minimum standards have adequate bite, this would
help reduce the race to the bottom problem. This proposal is subject to
many of the same objections as national chartering, just set out.
However, there is an important difference. National chartering would be
a major change from our current situation. National minimum standards
might be a major change too, or they might instead be seen as merely a
modification of our current situation, depending on the nature of the
national standards. That is because national securities laws are already
an important source of regulation. 20" To at least a degree, for instance,
those laws already set a form of minimum fiduciary duty. The securities
laws are largely focused on disclosure issues, but disclosure and
fiduciary duty are often closely linked-most violations of fiduciary
duty are undisclosed. 25' Thus, if we feel that race to the bottom type
concerns are creating serious problems, a modest extension of national
securities laws or rules may be in order. So long as they do not go too far
beyond what can be clearly justified, such changes fit relatively well
with the already existing framework in the U.S. The Burke/Keynes
approach is a recipe for modest, incremental change, not no change at
all. The current ferment caused by Enron, WorldCom, and other
corporate scandals seems most likely to end in some limited reforms of
this sort. Some reforms have begun, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, and corporate governance reforms initiated by the New York
Stock Exchange.5 2 1 do not think that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is all that
big a change, although some have touted it as such.253 I doubt its benefits

248. See Cary, supra note 4, at 701-03.
249. See id. at 702.
250. See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
251. The U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly said that federal securities laws should not
interfere with the state-law question of fiduciary duty. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 476, 478-79 (1977). However, the link just noted between disclosure and fiduciary duties has
made this distinction hard to draw. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 217-18, 221 (2d Cir.
1977).
252. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); Corporate
Governance Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from the NYSE Corporate Accountability
and Listing Standards Committee as Approved by the NYSE Board of Directors August 1, 2002
(No.
SR-NYSE-2002-33)
(proposed
Aug.
16,
2002),
available
at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-gov-pro-b.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
253. See Cunningham, supra note 247.
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will turn out to be as great as its sponsors suggest, nor its costs as great
as its detractors fear.
Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell have recently floated a rather
different suggestion. 254 Their proposal comes in two parts. First, they
suggest allowing corporations to opt in to a set of national rules
governing change of control transactions.255 On its own, this would
simply add one more supplier to the corporate charter law market. If one
believes the race to the bottom story, perhaps the national government
will offer a better law than Delaware. The problem, though, is getting
corporations to choose that law. That is where the second part of the
Bebchuk-Ferrell proposal comes in. They propose a mandatory national
rule giving shareholders in all -corporations, no matter where
incorporated, the right to initiate a vote choosing to opt in to the national
regime. 216 That could make it much harder for managers to choose and
stick to the corporate laws of a state which mistreats shareholders,
although the problems of shareholder apathy in voting and collective
action may well limit the practical effectiveness of this proposal even if
implemented.
This proposal has more going for it than national chartering. It is
less disruptive of the status quo, more narrowly targeted to an identified
problem, and still leaves corporations with a great deal of flexibility and
choice. It seems unlikely to cause a great deal of harm: if shareholders
really do like Delaware law, then presumably they will not vote to
follow the national regime. There are some scenarios in which certain
shareholders could abuse the system,"' but those scenarios seem to me
of limited concern.258 In the model of Section IV, the addition of one
more competing "state" (the national government) could conceivably
make the chances of finding a good dominant law a bit worse, but that
does not seem likely to be a significant effect here, and it may be that at
this point adding one new alternative, particularly a significantly
different one, would increase the chances of finding major
improvements on current law.
Thus, the Bebchuk-Ferrell proposal is quite reasonable, and I
support it. However, the case in favor of it is not overwhelmingly
254. See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 50, at 143-48.
255. See id. at 143. They limit their proposal to change in control because they see this as the
main area in which a race to the bottom has occurred. See id. at 161-62.
256. See id. at 148.
257. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in
CorporateLaw, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 964, 987 (2001 ).
258. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, FederalIntervention to Enhance Shareholder
Choice, 87 VA. L. REV. 993, 996-97 (2001).
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powerful. The expected costs are low, making the proposal decently
attractive, but with quite uncertain and possibly low expected benefits
(particularly given problems of shareholder apathy), the case for the
proposal is not incredibly strong. Furthermore, it is hard to find a strong
political constituency likely to push the idea, although perhaps large
institutional investors like CalPERS or TIAA-CREF might take the lead.
Unless the current problems brought on by Enron and other scandals
persist and worsen, I doubt there is the political will to make this idea
into law. That is too bad-but it's not all that bad.
Roberta Romano has made a reform proposal from the other end of
the debate, as a strong supporter of the race to the top story. 2 - 9 Romano
thinks that state competition has worked well enough in corporate law
that we should try it out in securities law as well. 26 She suggests that
corporations should be allowed to choose which state's securities laws
they will be governed by, just as they currently choose which corporate
law to be governed by. 26 ' The national government would cease to
automatically govern the securities transactions of all American
corporations, although the national government could offer a set of
securities laws as one alternative among which companies could
choose.262
If you truly believe the race to the top story, then indeed why not
extend the logic to securities law? However, once again, the case for the
race to the top hypothesis is just not strong enough to support this reform
idea. A race to the bottom in securities law could be extremely damaging
to American capital markets. After all, both foreign companies and
investors seem quite happy to enter those American capital markets,
even with the allegedly over-interventionist U.S. securities laws. Here,
as with national chartering, there just does not seem to be a good reason
to introduce such a major change. Romano herself recognizes that there
is little chance of her proposal becoming law.2 63 That is as it should be.

259. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2384 (1998).
260. See id. at 2385; see also Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 948-49

(1998).
261. See Romano, supra note 259, at 2402.
262. See id. at 2365.
263. See Dirk H. Bliesener, Discussion Report, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
219 (K.J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998) ("Professor Romano had already emphasized that the chances for
implementing her new competitive approach to securities regulation in the U.S. were as good as

winning in the state lottery without even purchasing a ticket.").
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Thus, my bottom-line policy recommendation, and the second main
argument of this Article, is that there is currently little need to
fundamentally alter the structure of American corporate and securities
law. The mix of federalism and nationalism of our present system seems
to be doing a decent enough job of protecting shareholders, or at least no
one has yet come up with an alternative that is clearly better enough to
risk trying. Some modest extensions of national rules in response to
Enron and other scandals may be called for, but these changes should,
and in all likelihood will, merely tweak the current system, not constitute
a fundamental change of it.
I should note one big caveat to this conclusion. I have taken as
given that the main concern of the law is to correctly balance the
relationship between shareholders and managers, and in particular, to
provide adequate protection of shareholders while still leaving managers
with the flexibility they need. I have, until now, left out the interests of
other groups affected by corporations. It is possible that current law does
not adequately protect the needs of some other groups. In particular,
corporate employees may not be well enough treated in the present
American system. Changing that might require some deep changes in the
American system. Even then, though, it is not clear to me that corporate
law federalism is a big part of that problem. If one wants to understand
why American corporate law ignores the interests of workers, one
should look mainly to broader and deeper issues of American politics
and society, not to Delaware's role in dictating corporate law. Indeed,
those interested in pursuing employee-oriented reforms to American
corporate law may well find that their best strategy is to first pursue
changes in a few progressive states and see how the changes work there.
States may still turn out to be the best laboratory for corporate
democracy.
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FIGURE 1

STATE COMPETITION V. FEDERAL REGULATION, PROBABLE OUTCOMES

State competition

Federal law
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TABLE 1: SIMULATION RESULTS-AVERAGE TIME TO LOCK-IN
Value of e

#of
States
.01

.005

.02

.03

.04

.05

.06

.07

.08

.09

2

118.670 62.310

25.210 20.295

12.480

10.135

10.085

7.160

6.735

5.985

3

180.520

78.065

42.305 28.585

20.540

15.585

12.105

9.630

9.150

8.450

4

213.695

88.360

46.540 30.535

24.110

17.540

15.435

12.620

9.840

9.030

5

215.605

96.805

50.630 30.705

23.945

18.650

15.565

13.305

10.940

9.105

6

211.925 111.785

53.115

31.500 24.565

21.775

17.345

13.415

12.005

10.765

7

220.270 113.265

53.530 35.555

26.305

20.090

15.780

14.145

12.540

10.585

8

243.290 121.405

52.965

36.750 26.365

20.960

17.520

12.925

11.895

9.585

9

231.560 113.190

52.395

34.035

23.885

22.145

17.790

13.935

12.125

11.415

10

246.260 114.385

59.680

36.355

24.720

20.350

17.310

14.535

12.070

11.540

50

249.500 113.120

51.750

37.910

27.995

19.975

17.745

14.715

11.760

10.765

TABLE

2:

SIMULATION RESULTS-AVERAGE DISTANCE FROM

# of

0.5

Distance from 0.5

States

.005

.01

.02

2

.175080

.159652

.17175

3

.156522 .159067 .168467 .182192 .175527 .165304 .182597 .182981 .192221 .191990

4

.162791

5

.156188 .157142 .182919 .181691 .182063 .176328 .202576 .193820 .198141 .194299

6

.155236 .174135 .175082 .178085 .190257 .206306 .204877 .210001 .206368 .215893

7

.157858 .181009 .173044 .208737 .186932 .195285 .194298 .187940 .202096 .197804

8

.178706 .181009 .173044 .208737 .186932 .195285 .200520 .190482 .181742 .197027

9

.158513 .174537 .167106 .177095 .180947 .197493 .215544 .204858 .195077 .204594

10

.171404 .177955 .190720 .181055 .189423 .205376 .201201 .199550 .205402 .218238

50

.167605 .160581 .168442 .188118 .201092 .179249 .208259 .203598 .208018 .210613

.03

.04

.05

.06

.07

.08

.09

.16898 .179914 .174099 .176555 .191709 .192274 .209547

.149199 .176312 .172993 .188160 .168157 .172448 .182918 .179737 .192712

